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Kansas Law Review
CONFESSIONS OF A HORIZONTALIST:
A DIALOGUE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Larry W. Yackle*
It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court has never developed a satisfying
theory of the first amendment. Free speech and press problems are many and
varied, demanding the most delicate balance of interests in order to preserve a
system of freedom of expression and at the same time afford proper respect for
competing governmental objectives. Doctrine adapted to one medium of expression
may not sit well when applied to others. With the passage of time, changes in
technology, economic conditions, and the very nature of expression tend to outstrip
the Court's ability to keep pace with doctrinal innovations. There was a time
when the first amendment meant little more than a prohibition on prior restraints
of the press, and it was only in this century that the Court fashioned the ill-fated
"clear and present danger" test for contending with subsequent penalties upon
expression. Even as the Court grappled with the meaning of free speech for a few
wartime dissenters, technological advancements transformed the communications
industry in this country into an extraordinary complex of mass circulation newspapers supported by the great wire services, broadcast stations and networks using
the electromagnetic spectrum, and community antenna systems relying upon microwave transmissions and the coaxial cable. Most importantly, control of the industry
came rapidly into the hands of communications cartels wielding untold power over
American affairs, public and private. Analyses designed for other times and other
problems were no match for these challenges, and the Court groped for new tools
with which to meet them.
All this might have occasioned legislation, for it is Congress that has the wherewithal to investigate and resolve complex problems with thorough-going enactments
that by nature are superior to the gradualism of case-by-case adjudication. To be
sure, Congress did enter the field-but only in the fashion of the Roosevelt years,
by establishing an administrative agency with ill-defined responsibility for orchestrating the use of the radio spectrum. Congress left unattended related problems in
other communications fields, and even with regard to broadcasting little attention
was paid to expression-related matters. Later, when Congress focused upon the
content of broadcast signals, its actions were poorly conceived and accordingly
proved counterproductive, provoking hostility from all sides. Even today, as Congress debates proposals to "rewrite" the fundamental communications statute, it
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, University of Kansas;
LL.M. 1974, Harvard University. Research for this Article was supported by the University of Alabama
Research Grants Committee. Steve Suitts, Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council, criticized
an early draft. While Mr. Suitts does not share all the views expressed here, his comments have helped
to ensure technical accuracy, and his insights into fundamental problems have contributed significantly
to any success this Article may enjoy.
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appears that free speech issues are subordinated to the economic interests of the
industrial giants sought to be controlled.
Meanwhile, developments in communications continue apace. It now seems
clear that broadcasting will in time displace newspapers entirely and, in turn, that
broadcasting will be displaced by still more dramatic technological achievements.
Already cable systems pose a serious threat to broadcast interests. Before very long,
broadband programming, satellite communications unrestricted by the horizon,
and fiber optics will eclipse over-the-air broadcasting by local stations. Two-way
communications systems are already in use, promising to transform the making of
public policy as we know it. Perhaps most troubling, subliminal messages seem
destined to invade our homes in the guise of entertainment programming, influenciing American thought and behavior in ways not even their creators can comprehend. Plainly, if these developments are left to be dealt with by Congress, the
enormously significant free speech consequences will be swallowed up by the political
and economic concerns of conglomerates that wish to fend off any technology they
cannot dominate. It is critical, then, that the Court fashion a constitutional doctrine
that has up to now eluded it. Never in our history has free speech at once faced
such enormous potential for expansion and such frightening threats of obliteration.
The dialogue that follows makes no attempt to address the fascinating questions
posed by technological and economic developments still in the future. Its sights
are lowered to an examination of the Court's work to date, in an effort to identify
doctrinal strains that hold some promise of usefulness in the years ahead. In this
field, as in others, the Court will likely find answers to important questions, not in
radical insights that arrive unannounced, but in ideas or combinations of ideas that
have already appeared from time to time in court opinions and related literature.
The dialogue draws upon three such ideas-(1) an asserted ban on content discrimination in free speech cases, (2) a demand for access to the mass media for
speakers and messages outside the communications industry, and (3) a recognition
of governmental responsibility for the present state of affairs. This third idea rejects the "state action" barrier to the application of constitutional analysis to impediments to free speech that are erected by ostensibly private interests. The dialogue
gives these notions a collective name-horizontalism-and suggests how they can
be employed to address free speech issues that the Court has failed to treat adequately
on more familiar theoretical bases. To the extent the dialogue is successful, it may
offer theoretical tools with which the Court may work in resolving the increasingly
difficult issues that lie ahead.
Q: What, may I ask, is a horizontalist?
A: Simply one who has wrestled with a fundamental question emerging from
free speech jurisprudence and come to at least a tentative resolution. The primary
free speech question at present is whether the focus of the first amendment is vertical
or horizontal. If the focus is vertical, the first amendment appraises the relationship
between government and the individual apart from the interests of others and
proscribes governmental interference with the individual's speech except in circumstances in which extraordinary societal interests justify restraint. If the focus is
horizontal, the first amendment views the interest of the individual against the
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background of the interests of others and permits, even demands, governmental
involvement to referee expression in a manner that prevents some speakers and
messages from drowning out others.
Q: I am not certain that I understand. I agree that in state cases ostensibly controlled by the fourteenth amendment the Court has held, more or less, that due
process means free speech.' But you seem to suggest that free speech, in turn, means
equal protection of the laws.'
A: That is not far off the mark. The verticalist emphasizes language. "The
Congress shall make no law . . . ." The first amendment is understood to establish
a bias against governmental involvement in speech. It takes society as it finds it.
Inequalities in wealth, position, and power are accepted, and governmental intervention is no less suspicious when it comes in the guise of strengthening the marketplace of ideas by enhancing the ability of the weak to make themselves heard. The
horizontalist, on the other hand, does not wince at every governmental involvement
in expression-related activity, but asks in every case whether the government's intervention advances the presentation of competing views, without unjustifiably favoring
one message over another. The fault in the eyes of the horizontalist is not governmental involvement but governmental involvement that discriminates on the basis
of the content of speech.
Q: And the latter is your view?
A: I confess to you that I am a horizontalist. But make no mistake. I hardly
suppose that there are no more than two ways of looking at any first amendment
case, that they can be labeled verticalist or horizontalist, and that I can and will choose
the horizontalist view consistently. Nevertheless, I do believe that an acknowledgement of the problem of first amendment focus clarifies thinking and aids understanding. And, for myself anyway, I find the horizontal focus far more satisfying
in treating the free speech issues of the modern age.
Q: Let me confess that your position is surprising. I have always thought you
to be a staunch defender of individual liberty. I am astonished that you should define
these two competing views of the first amendment as you have and then adopt the
one that contemplates significant governmental interference with speech.
A: To be candid, it has taken me a long time to reach this position. Like others
who usually find themselves on the side of the individual, I entertain what I consider to be a healthy suspicion of government. For the better part of my professional
life I have quite naturally embraced the more traditional, verticalist approach to
the first amendment. When in doubt, it may fairly be proposed that the civil
libertarian should resist governmental intervention and insist upon private autonomy.
That, at any rate, has been the working theory of those in the forefront of libertarian
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming that freedom of speech is "among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
'See Karst, Equality as the Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975).
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thought through the middle third of this century.' Up to now, verticalism has made
eminent good sense. I daresay that we have built a system of freedom of expression in this country in large measure by repeated successes in keeping government

out of the expression field. Now, however, I am convinced that circumstances have
changed. The attempt to exclude government has ultimately failed or is failing, and
if freedom of expression is to be maintained into a second century, it must have
the assistance rather than the neglect of government. Mine is a new generation.

I have come to intellectual maturity in the age of mass communications, and I
believe that first amendment theory must take account of that undeniable change
of circumstances.
Q: Do you mean to imply that the tension between the verticalist and horizontalist views of the first amendment is entirely new? Has it no history?
A: To be sure it does. I have mentioned Holmes' metaphor.4

The mental

picture of a marketplace of ideas in which all views may be offered for belief
acknowledges that government has no business favoring one over another. Indeed,
to some extent, Holmes can be characterized as an early horizontalist, and Meiklejohn,
who now is usually associated with horizontalism,5 as a verticalist. It was Meiklejohn who criticized Holmes for failing to distinguish between political and other
speech.' What was that if not content discrimination?
Q: I am not sure where you are going, but it seems to me that you will have
difficulty locating your horizontalism in the mind of a man who was simply apBenno Schmidt's excellent little book provides a good summary.
First Amendment theory has long been the preserve of laissez-faire thinking. The premise has
been that "a multitude of tongues," protected by the First Amendment from governmental interference, would naturally tend to produce diversity of expression in which all shades of opinion
could compete for political or cultural acceptance. The Bill of Rights generally reflects a conception of liberty as a collection of negative controls on official power. Consequently, the First Amendment has been viewed in negative terms: a constitutional prohibition on official interference
with the free play of ideas.
B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 29 (1976). While this passage surely does
capture the essence of traditional theory, it is important, and only fair, to note that even those who have
embraced verticalist thinking most fervently have occasionally remarked on its shortcomings in dealing
with the problem of concentration of control within the communications media. Professor Chafee concluded his great work with a warning that in times to come it might not be sufficient protection for
free speech merely to put obstacles in the way of government censorship. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH]. A half dozen years
later, Chafee served as reporter for an extensive investigation of the mass media undertaken by the Commission on Freedom of the Press. Although the resulting report concluded that for the most part
governmental action to encourage free speech was fraught with too many risks, the two-volume study
first examined a wide range of issues that now concern horizontalists. Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947) [hereinafter cited as Z. CHAFER, GOVERNMENT]. See also M. ERNST, THE
FIRST FREEDOM (1946) (focusing upon the evils of monopoly). More recently, Professor Emerson's
equally important book devoted a full chapter to the "affirmative promotion" of free expression.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627-73 (1970) [hereinafter cited as T. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM].

'Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. at 630.
'See notes 82-86 and accompanying text in/ra.
"A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 29-50 (1965).
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plying laissez-faire economics to the realm of free speech. 7 Surely you will agree
that Holmes thought his marketplace would function without significant government oversight.
A: You are quite correct. I cannot recruit Holmes to my view retrospectively,
though I insist that his opinions recognized, at least implicitly, that the first amendment has something to do with a prohibition on content discrimination.
Q: Take, if you will, the Chaplinsky8 dictum. I would contend that it contemplated content discrimination.
A: I would agree, but I would hasten to add that, with the exception of obscenity 9 it appears that the forms of expression listed in Chaplinsky have now
been accorded first amendment protection. 1° That, I think, reflects the Court's
growing concern for horizontalism. There are other examples, of course. I find it
difficult to distinguish between a first amendment overbreadth analysis 1 and one
examining a legislative classification for over-inclusiveness. 2 Similarly, the test for
reviewing government action that burdens the right of association' 3 or symbolic
speech' 4 is, to my mind, indistinguishable from the standard used by the Warren
'Id. at 51-77 (identifying Holmes as an excessive individualist who read into the first amendment
his own "bad man" theory of law). See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942),
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace (footnote
omitted).
Id. at 571-72.
'See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
"See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (profanity); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (libel). Cf. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (striking down as overbroad a
statute attempting to punish fighting words while arguably reaffirming the exclusion of fighting words
from first amendment protection).
UE.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964),
This Court has repeatedly held that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Id. at 307 (emphasis added). See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv.
844 (1970).
IE.g.,
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
The statute . . . fails to satisfy the requirements of equal protection, since the State has not
borne its burden of proving that its compelling interest could not be achieved by a more precisely
tailored statute or by use of feasible, less drastic means . . . . [The statute] is plainly overinclusive ....
Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
"E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960),
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Id. at 488 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
" E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
I hasten to concede that, while the test in O'Brien is literally similar to the standards reported in
notes 11-15, the Court's apparent impression of it is something else again. The compelling-interest/
least-restrictive-alternative test is plainly thought to be the most stringent test available in right of
association, equal protection, and overbreadth cases. In O'Brien, however, it was understood to be a
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Court in upper-tier equal protection cases. 15
Q: I am beginning to follow. Am I correct in assuming that you find a horizontal
focus in the public forum cases?'
A: Yes. My present question whether the focus of the first amendment is
vertical or horizontal is in some respects merely another way of putting the more
familiar question whether speakers are entitled to "minimum" or "equal" access to
public places.Y
Q: I take it you embrace the "equal" access view?
A: After a fashion. I certainly do not propose, as equal access adherents have at
times suggested, that equal treatment can be provided by imposing a blanket prohibition on speech in public areas. Here I agree with Kenneth Karst. Since some
speakers, notably the poor and others who lack access to alternative means of communication, depend upon some forums to make themselves heard, however feebly,
government action that closes those areas, even to all expression, is not content
diluted standard-to be distinguished from the test used in real speech cases. E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 363 n.17 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974). Indeed, O'Brien has
rarely been relied upon by the Court for a holding since its appearance at the height of the Vietnam War.
Compare Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) with Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S.
50 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The case has enjoyed acceptance primarily in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, where it has served as the point of departure for decisions later overturned
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valco, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 412
U.S. 94 (1973). In both instances, the Court of Appeals opinion bears the mark of Judge Skelly Wright,
whose understanding of the first amendment approaches my own horizontalism. See note 71 infra.
Of course, verticalists have condemned O'Brien as a "serious setback," T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra
note 3, at 83, and it appears that it may no longer be viable at all after the recent round of decisions
emphasizing inquiries into legislative motive. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra. For my
part, O'Brien's mindless disregard for reality was objectionable, but no more so than the imposition of
enormous problems of proof in the new cases. Like Professor Emerson, I find the decision in O'Brien
outrageous. On the other hand, like Judge Wright, I find the standard of review the Court purported
to apply familiar and altogether serviceable, particularly in judging the validity of governmental attempts
to promote expression and expression-related activity.
"5 E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969),
[T]he issue is not whether the legislative judgments are rational. A more exacting standard
obtains. The issue is whether the . . . requirements do in fact sufficiently further a compelling
state interest to justify denying the franchise to appellant and members of his class . . . . [T]he
classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members of his class is
necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.
Id. at 632-33 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964),
But we deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants ....
Our inquiry, therefore, is whether there clearly appears in the relevant materials some overriding
statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct ....
...Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of
justification, as we have said, and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally
related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.
Id. at 191-94 (emphasis added). See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
"eSee the cases cited in Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 1 [hereinafter cited as Kalven, Public Forum].
"7See Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 117 (1975).
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neutral.'" It favors the speech of those who can go elsewhere, to CBS or the New
York Times.'9 If government is to be truly content neutral it must make at least
some forums available for expression. The remaining difficulty lies in determining
which places or structures must be open for such use.2 °

Q: How would you do that?
A: The problem is far from easy. Of course, any forum government chooses
to open must be available to all, but I have already said that I would not limit
public forums to those that government volunteers. Similarly, I would not be satisfied
with the suggestion in Hague that only traditionalforums must be open. 21 If history
is allowed to control, speakers may be routed to streets and parks and away from
public buildings and other places where speech can be effective. Indeed, if speech
is to be meaningful at all in this age, it must have access to newspapers and the
broadcast and cable media. If I am pressed, I will settle upon the approach suggested in Justice Douglas' Adderley dissent. 22 Analysis should begin with a predisposition in favor of speech and should ask in every case whether the potential
's Karst, supra note 2, at 40-41 (explaining how content discrimination can be hidden behind facially
neutral blanket prohibitions). See Kalven, Public Forum, supra note 16.
In the Jehovah's Witness cases, the Court had been outspokenly sensitive "to the poor man's
printing press" theme. Labor picketing apart, perhaps, the parade, the picket, the leaflet, the sound
truck, have been the media of communication exploited by those with little access to the more
genteel means of communication. We would do well to avoid the occasion for any new epigrams
about the majestic equality of the law prohibiting the rich man, too, from distributing leaflets
or picketing.
Id. at 30.
" Karst, supra note 2, at 41 (recognizing that "the content of messages carried by leafleters and pickets
is apt to differ significantly from the content of the daily press and the broadcast media"). See, e.g.,
Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974) (invalidating an absolute
ban on distributing leaflets in a welfare office waiting room), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
' There is, of course, one more matter-determining the consequences of a finding that a place is
not a public forum. On first blush, one would assume that the answer is self-evident. If a place is not
a public forum, government can close it absolutely to expression-related activity. The cases, however,
suggest something quite different. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), discussed in note 32 infra,
the Court decided that a street running through a military installation was not a forum, and, accordingly,
that Dr. Spock could be barred from campaigning there. Yet it was clear from the record that the
authorities permitted other speakers and entertainers to appear. Only political candidates were excluded
-a clear case of content discrimination. In dissent, Justice Brennan contended unremarkably that,
whatever might have been true in the abstract, by allowing some speakers to use the base the authorities
had voluntarily opened a forum and could not thereafter discriminate among speakers and messages.
The majority's rejection of that view suggests that the Court may recognize a class of places, not public
forums, where government is free to discriminate on the basis of the content of speech. Cf. Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (indicating that the effect of finding a
place not to be a public forum is to dilute the standard of review brought to bear upon content discrimination to a relaxed search for "rationality"). To my mind, all this illustrates intellectual sloppiness,
if not dishonesty. Government simply cannot discriminate between speech it likes and speech it dislikes
in public forums that must be, or voluntarily are, opened for speech. In the rare case in which government is permitted to withhold a potential forum from duty, the withdrawal must be complete. If once
a favored speaker is permitted to appear on previously forbidden turf, a forum is created and all comers
must be given their turn.
' Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Id. at 515-16 (emphasis added). Accord, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
2Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
Justice Black held for the Court that a demonstration
outside the door of a jail could be suppressed because the state "no less than a private owner of property,
has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. at
47. In dissent, Justice Douglas insisted that in the absence of evidence that the demonstration interfered
significantly with the operation of the jail, the picketing must be protected as a petition for redress of
grievances. Id. at 51-52.
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forum can be opened for expression-related activity without unduly disrupting its
use for other legitimate purposes. Some places may be so committed to other pur-

poses that their use for speech would be anomalous;1 3 others may lend themselves
to speech only on occasion.
The task in every case is to put government to its
proof of good reasons for denying access for speech. To use a familiar phrase,
government should be made to show that its policy with regard to a potential forum
is the least restrictive alternative-denying access for expression-related activity only
25
Of
when the forum's legitimate devotion to other purposes makes it necessary.
course, reasonable time, place, and manner regulations can be invoked to reduce
disruption of other activities.2 At bottom, government should succeed in withholding a potential forum only if it is shown that no reasonable rules can accommodate all legitimate interests.
Q: How do you appraise the Court's record to date?
A: It is a mixed bag. Viewed realistically, most of the demonstration and sit-in
cases that came to the Warren Court a decade or more ago demanded neither more
nor less than a recognition that the first amendment has a horizontal focus, and in
retrospect I think the Court did a fair job of responding to the legitimate demands
of Blacks for meaningful forums from which to challenge American racism. 7
Adderley2 8 and, in some respects, Brown2 9 were disappointing, but the Cox cases'"
better represent the period. The ground gained for horizontalism there led naturally
enough to the high watermark thus far-the Mosley case 3 in 1972. More recently,
however, there has been some slippage. The Spock case 32 embraces the very his" Justice Douglas conceded that the Senate gallery might be such a place. Id. at 54. I would add
the Court's own courtroom or a law school classroom. Such places are public in the sense that they are
publicly owned, but they are not proper forums for public speech because that expression cannot be
accommodated without disrupting their use for the purposes to which they are dedicated.
'Justice Douglas' examples were the familiar street demonstration cases. It is one thing to propose
that the streets must be open for parades and quite another to maintain that a busy thoroughfare must
be made available during rush hour.
'I recognize that the Court has encountered difficulty with this analysis, see Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969), but it seems to me that, as in other first
amendment contexts, the matter comes down to simply requiring government to carry a heavy burden
of proof.
"Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
'See generally H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
'Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), discussed in notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
' Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that a peaceful sit-in at a library was protected
by the first amendment).
' Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Cox I)
(holding that a peaceful parade and demonstration was protected by the first amendment).
' Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating on its face an ordinance prohibiting demonstrations near school buildings but exempting labor picketing from the ban). Although
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court relied heavily upon the equal protection reasoning in Justice
Black's dissent in Cox II, he made it clear that the equal protection claim was "closely intertwined with
First Amendment interests." Id. at 95.
"Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court upheld a ban
on partisan speeches at Fort Dix in New Jersey. At the outset, Stewart distinguished Flower v. United
States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), a per curiam decision that had summarily reversed a conviction for distributing leaflets on a street within a military installation in San Antonio. In Flower, said Justice
Stewart, the military authorities had abandoned any claim of special interest in the street where the
leafletting occurred and thus had transformed it into a traditional forum for expression like any other
public street. In Greer, however, Fort Dix had not abandoned the area where Dr. Spock wished to
distribute literature. In distinguishing Flower in that way and choosing to rely instead upon "the
historically unquestioned power of [a] commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the
area of his command," 424 U.S. at 838 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893
(1961)), Stewart plainly embraced Hague's proposition that the definition of a public forum turns on
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8
torical approach I have condemned, the best language in Southeastern Promotions
3
4
is only dicta, and, of course, there is Shaker Heights. Again I concur with Professor Karst. That was an easy case, wrongly decided. 5 Cases such as Shaker Heights
cause me concern for the new minorities who are even now demanding access to
meaningful avenues of communication to put their case to society at large. The
their rightful
obvious example is gay liberation. How, may I ask, are gays to assert
36
place in this society without access to meaningful public forums?
the use to which a potential forum has been put in the past. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, The Legacy
of Greer v. Spock: The Public Forum Doctrine and the Principle of the Military's Poiltical Neutrality,
65 GEO. L.J. 773 (1977).
" Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Billed as the case that would
decide whether the stage production of "Hair" was obscene, Southeastern proved disappointing to some.
Perhaps because Henry Monaghan handled the Supreme Court argument, the Court decided only that the
directors of the Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium had imposed an invalid prior restraint when they
summarily rejected an application to perform the play without so much as reading the script. See
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970). Cf. Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965) (overturning a state censorship statute for failure to provide adequate procedural
safeguards against unjustified inhibition of protected expression). Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun's opinion
for the Court did find that municipal theaters are public forums, "designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities."
420 U.S. at 555. And Blackmun did emphasize that the applicant "was not seeking to use
a facility primarily serving a competing use." Id. On the latter point, he cited Adderley. Still, given the
resolution of the case on the prior restraint ground, any disparaging comments about the "classificatory
aspects of the board's decision" were "unessential" to the decision. 420 U.S. at 556 n.8 (citing Interstate
Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (the decision invalidating an administrative board's system of
classifying films as "suitable" or not foryoung people)).
" Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The case called for a straightforward
public forum analysis. The city had voluntarily offered card space on public buses for paid commercial
advertisements but had refused to sell space to political candidates. The resulting content discrimination
was apparent. 418 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that having opened a forum for
communication the city was barred from "discriminating among forum users solely on the basis of
message content"). A plurality opinion by Justice Blackmun, however, managed to view the case
differently. Reasoning that the sale of card space to commercial interests was merely part of a "commercial venture," Blackmun insisted that no public forum was "here to be found." Id. at 303-04.
Accordingly, the Court held that only a relaxed standard of review for rationality was appropriate, and
that the exclusion of political advertisements had to be approved. Justice Douglas cast the deciding vote.
Remembering, perhaps too vividly in this case, the troubling experience with piped-in music in Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (in which Justice Douglas dissented), he declared
himself unwilling to approve any advertising forced upon the captive audience using public transportation. Passing over the content discrimination issue, Justice Douglas said simply that the validity of the
commercial advertising program was not before the Court. Id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring). It
seems fair to assume that if it had been, Justice Douglas would have struck it down; and with all
messages removed from the cards a horizontalist might be satisfied (at least so long as the resulting
absolute bar did not hide content discrimination of its own). See text at notes 18-20 supra. The difficulty
in Shaker Heights was that Justice Douglas was unable to eliminate all messages at once, and his vote
left standing the most invidious content discrimination imaginable-discrimination against political
expression.
's Karst, supra note 2, at 36.
I do not speak here of the question whether sexual preferences and behavior are themselves forms
of expression protected by the first amendment or the cluster of constitutionally grounded interests collectively denominated as the right of privacy. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the abortion
case) and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing special protection for
family relationships) with Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library ....U.S ......
99 S. Ct. 734 (1978)
(denying certiorari in a case regarding loss of public employment because of living arrangements not
shown to affect job performance); Gaylord v. Tacoma School District, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (denying
certiorari in a case concerning penalties upon the status of homosexuality); and Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summarily affirming a criminal conviction for homosexual conduct).
I consider it only sensible that sexual preferences and behavior receive substantive protection. Compare
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977) (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.)
(suggesting that the Court has not yet settled these questions) with id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (insisting that most issues were resolved in Doe). It seems to me equally important that gays
have an opportunity to speak in the ordinary sense about their views and feelings. It is through speech
and more speech, the free trade in ideas, that any minority will finally win the majority's tolerance and
understanding. This was and is true for racial and ethnic minorities. E.g., F. LEwaLs, THE USES OF
THE MEDIA BY THE CHICANO MOVEMENT (1974); R. WOLSELEY, THE BLACK PRESS, USA (1971).
And
it is certainly true for gays. See Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976),
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Q: Does your scorn for Shaker Heights bespeak a general dissatisfaction with
the work of the Burger Court?

A: Again, I think the record is uneven. Painting with the broadest of brushes,
it seems to me that this Court's individual liberty decisions across the board reflect
a fundamental lack of sensitivity to the grave matters at stake.1 7 But in the first
amendment field, the decisions are often surprisingly good. Of course, the obscenity
cases are an exception, 8s but Erznoznik, 39 Stuart,4" and certainly Wooley 4' are most
encouraging. It remains to be seen what the Court will make of its equally encouraging interest in commercial expression. 4 2 By acknowledging that commercial
speech has first amendment protection the Court rejects one form of content discrimination, but by promptly suggesting that speech that merely proposes a bargain
is entitled only to diluted protection it embraces yet another.4 3 I detest toothpaste
advertisements as much as anyone, but I cannot justify a hierarchy of protected
speech, with political debate at the top and commercial expression, and perhaps noncert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) (denying gays access to a college newspaper); Alaska Gay Coalition
v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978) (guaranteeing access to an official directory of community
organizations).
'See L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW (1974).
'Even
the Court's feeble attempts in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to limit prosecutions
by tightening obscenity statutes have failed. Prosecutions continue apace. Project: An Empirical Inquiry
into the Eflects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 810 (1977).
'Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking down a ban on the exhibition of
nude scenes from a drive-in theater screen visible from the street).
"°Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating a "gag order" imposed upon
the press).
'Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (enjoining enforcement of a New Hampshire statute
requiring motorists to display a license plate bearing the state motto against persons who find the
ideological message implicit in the motto inconsistent with their moral beliefs).
"USee Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Associates v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (rejecting a first amendment claim in part on the theory that
the activity referred to in an advertisement was unlawful).
"In an important footnote in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court insisted that while commercial expression is protected under the first amendment there are "commonsense differences between
speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' and other varieties," and that, accordingly, "a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired." 425 U.S. at 721 n.24 (citation omitted). In addition, since its
accuracy may be more easily verified and its connection with profit-making is sufficiently close, commercial speech may be hardier than other expression and thus better able to bear the burden of regulation.
Id. It is plain enough that the Court is laying the groundwork for approving familiar forms of regulation,
notwithstanding commercial expression's newly found constitutional footing. There is every indication,
for example, that the Court will continue to uphold restrictions on false or misleading advertising. See
Friedman v. Rogers, .
U.S- ..... 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
383 (1977). Similarly, regulation designed to promote interests unrelated to expression may be approved
even though it indirectly burdens commercial speech. See Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977) (avoiding a decision on the validity of zoning regulations banning or
restricting the placement of all signs). Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (protecting an
attorney's non-commercial solicitation of clients for public interest litigation) with Ohralik v. Ohio, 436
U.S. 447 (1978) (approving a penalty for in-person commercial solicitations). There is even evidence
that some Justices will take a special interest in advertising directed to children. See Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 711-12 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (indicating that he would approve
narrowly drawn restrictions responding to legitimate concerns about the effect of advertising on the
young). See notes 124-28 and accompanying text infra. Finally, it appears that the Court may not
employ its most protective techniques in aid of commercial expression. E.g., Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. at 380-81 (declining to hear an overbreadth challenge). See generally Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffries,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Note,
First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cm.
L. REv. 205 (1976).
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obscene pornography, near the bottom." I do not believe that the Court can draw
such lines.
Q: Do other recent decisions suggest how this Court sees the first amendment's focus?
A: Turning to them I find only confusion, traceable to a consistent failure to
recognize the two competing views I have described. A few examples will do.
46
In Healy,4" decided early o the Court recognized that ideas must have a forum
I count that case as one of this Court's best. Yet, on other occasions when a similar

solicitude has been called for, the Court has seemed oddly insensitive. I have men-

tioned Spock, but Madison School District47 provides another example. The Court
recognized the content discrimination issue and, in fact, decided the case on that
ground." In disturbing dicta, however, both the majority opinion and the concurrences made it clear that the Constitution would not require the forum to be
open in the first instance. 9 Two inferences may be drawn. One is that this Court
may see horizontalism as a convenient and preferred ground of decision when it is
troubled by the consequences of a verticalist approach.5 0 The other is that when the
Court once chooses a horizontal focus in a case, it is all too quick to assume that
the only constitutional difficulty lies in content discrimination on the face of governmental action and that, accordingly, an absolute bar to speech would be sufficiently
1
neutral to pass muster. I have already told you what I would do with that. In
"See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (proposing that the first amendment interest in protecting erotic but nonobscene materials is "of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate"). Cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 716-17 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that even protected speech may be regulated
to reduce its "offensiveness").
"Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (decided with Mosley).
"The dispute in Healy was over the refusal of a state college to recognize a local chapter of the
Students for a Democratic Society. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, went immediately to the
crux of things.
The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was demonstrated in this case when, several days after the President's decision was announced, petitioners were not allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop because they
were not an approved group.
Id. at 181. When the college suggested that the organization was free to meet off campus, the Court
insisted that the Constitution protects against indirect as well as frontal attacks on protected rights. "We
are not free," said Justice Powell, "to disregard the practical realities." Id. at 183.
' City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167
(1976).
"Indeed, the Court relied on Mosley for the proposition that "when the board sits in public meetings
to conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between
speakers on the basis of their employment, or the content of their speech." Id. at 176.
"The majority made clear its view that "public bodies may confine their meetings to specified
subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business." Id. at 175 n.8. Justice Brennan's.
concurrence was even more forceful, insisting that "the First Amendment plainly does not prohibit
Wisconsin from limiting attendance at a collective-bargaining session to school board and union bargaining
representatives and denying [an individual teacher] the right to attend and speak at the session." Id. at
178. If, as seems likely, Justice Brennan's view in Madison was nourished by a concern that union bargaining might be upset by according access to individual members, his effective acceptance of a blanket
prohibition may not be imported into other first amendment cases. There is hope for that, at least.
At any rate, we may take encouragement from his agreement that, whatever may be the fate of closed
meetings by government agencies, once an agency decides to conduct an open session it may not discriminate among speakers "on the basis of what they intend to say." Id. at 179.
'But see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The political patronage system under attack in Elrod
might have been struck down for discriminating on the basis of employees' political affiliations. Instead,
a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan chose a more vertical focus and found the system to burden substantive freedoms of belief and association, irrespective of the effect upon others.
'See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
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Madison I would ask whether disenchanted school teachers would be denied a
meaningful opportunity to express themselves by closed board meetings. The answer
is, I think, plain enough. There is a constitutional dimension to open meeting laws.5"
Q: Are those inferences supported by other decisions?
A: Perhaps, but I am not prepared to argue that they are. Again, I find confusion in the cases. Take Doyle5 3 a case that has caused consternation among those
who must now prove that the suppression of speech was the "motivating factor"
behind a dismissal from public employment.5 4 The importation of analysis born
in equal protection cases into the first amendment field suggests a horizontal focus.
Indeed, as I think of it, Doyle may suggest that the old problem of preventing government from suppressing speech that it disapproves55 may best be treated by prohibiting purposeful discrimination, not only in employment and housing but in
expression as well. There is a comment in Young that suggests as much. 6 On the
other hand, nothing in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Doyle squarely embraces that
view. Other Burger Court cases are plainly schizophrenic. In Buckley"7 the Court's
approval of campaign contribution limitations suggests a horizontal focus. The
Court applied a stringent standard of review, but upheld government's decision to
become involved in expression-related activity in order to equalize the ability of
supporters to register their support for the candidates of their choice. Limitations
on contributions are valid, perhaps in part because they are content neutral. 58 Yet,
restrictions on expenditures were struck down in Buckley. While the per curiam
opinion gives a plausible rationale for the distinction, 9 I have to think that the real
5
See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 671-73; Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press
Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HARv. L. REv. 1199, 1204 (1962). But see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (stating that the "Constitution does
not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole."). I would
argue, for example, that if Congress had not enacted the Freedom of Information Act as a matter of
policy, substantially the same result would have been reached under the Constitution of its own force.
Cf. W. MARNELL, THE RirT To KNOW 34 (1973) (proposing a government newspaper). I recognize,
of course, the potential conflict with individual privacy, but it seems to me that the danger can be
mitigated by restrictions on government's authority to collect and retain information, which the Court
has thus far declined to impose. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
' Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
"Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was clear that a public employee who challenges a dismissal
must prove not only that his or her conduct is constitutionally protected but that it was a "motivating
factor" in the dismissal decision. Id. at 287. With a vague citation to Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.8 (1977), see Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287 n. 2 , Justice Rehnquist appears to have imported emphasis upon
legislative purpose or motivation, only recently born in an employment case, Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), and nurtured in a housing case, Arlington Heights, into the first amendment field.
M
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
the expression of orthodox views rarely needs protection); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(the red flag case). Another problem is demanding speech that government does approve. See Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that an individual cannot be forced to become "an instrument
for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable"); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (the flag salute case).
'Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 64 (1976) (reiterating that the "sovereign's
agreement or disagreement with the content of what a speaker has to say may not affect the regulation of
the time, place, or manner of presenting the speech.").
'See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
" L. TmsE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 803 (1977).
'sWhile a contribution is a "general expression of support for the candidate," the effectiveness of
that communication "does not increase perceptibly with the size of [the] contribution" 424 U.S. at 21.
A limitation on the amount that can be contributed thus does not greatly impinge upon the contributor's
speech. The candidate may use the contribution to spread his or her campaign message, but "the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." Id.
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explanation is a sudden shift in focus to verticalism. Now the Court resists the
congressional attempt to equalize the influence of the poor and the wealthy upon
the outcome of elections. The notorious imbalance in wealth in American society
is something to be accepted as a given by the first amendment, and governmental
manipulation of expenditures in an attempt to counter its invidious effects is disapproved as a direct burden upon the individual's speech. That the restrictions fall,
like rain, upon Republicans, Democrats, and Communists is, on this vertical focus,
irrelevant.60 Of course, the tension between verticalism and horizontalism comes
3
62
61
to the fore most obviously in the mass media cases-Red Lion, CBS, Tornillo,1
and, most recently, Pacifica.4
Q: Let me interrupt. I mean to question you at some length on those cases,
but first let me ask whether individual Justices or perhaps commentators have come
to grips with the focus problem and dealt with it more precisely than the Court's
collegial opinions.
A: In the main, I find most opinions to be verticalist but there are exceptions.
Although I will criticize it when you give me the opportunity, Justice White's
opinion in Red Lion marked a departure, 5 and only Justice Douglas failed to join
it. 66 Justice Marshall's opinion in Mosley was also unanimous.6 7 More recently, the
Expenditures, on the other hand, do go to the reach of the individual's views, and a limitation on independent spending in aid of a candidate is a direct and significant burden upon expression. Id. at 19.

'See Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 323, 337-38 (comparing the Court's treatment of expenditure
limitations to its principal verticalist decisions); L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 1134-35 (viewing the Buckley
decision as indicative of the Court's commitment to existing wealth distributions).
'Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the "personal attack" and
"political editorial" aspects of the "fairness doctrine").
' Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (declining to require
broadcasters to sell time for political advertisements).
'Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a state "right of
reply"4 statute).
' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (approving an FCC order stating that a radio
station might have been sanctioned for broadcasting a "filthy words" dialogue by George Carlin at an
inappropriate hour).
Relying in the main upon the scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation, see text at notes 129-39
infra, White said,
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.
...No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency ...
By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand
no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the
licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the
airwaves.
Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which
beset the people or to exclude from the airways anything but their own views of fundamental
questions.
395 U.S. at 388-90, 394.
' Justice Douglas did not hear oral argument and, evidently for that reason alone, took no part in the
decision. Id. at 401. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154
(Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that he would not support the Red Lion decision today).
'Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the result without opinion, and the Chief Justice concurred separately only to make clear that
"the First Amendment does not literally mean that we 'are guaranteed the right to express any thought,
free from government censorship.' " Id. at 103. He mentioned, for example, the obscenity cases.
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Brennan and Marshall opinion in CBS shows horizontalist leanings. 68 Then again,
I suspect that Justice Brennan was the principal author of the Buckley per curiam,6"
and I have already said what I think of that case.

Q: Commentators?
A: They are now rapidly choosing up sides. To name only a few, Kenneth
Karst,70 Judge Skelly Wright, 71 and, of course, Jerome Barron7 2 look toward horizontalism. Benno Schmidt, 73 Thomas Emerson, 74 and Paul Freund,7 5 it appears,
61412 U.S. at 170. Although the opinion ranges broadly into matters not essential to horizontalist
analysis, to the extent that it complains that broadcasters gladly accept commercial advertisements but
exclude political messages, it focuses upon the content discrimination that concerns the horizontalist most
deeply. Id. at 200-0 1.
s I assume that none of the Justices who wrote separately took primary responsibility for the collegial
opinion, and that alone eliminates the Chief Justice and Justices White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Blackmun.
Since Stevens did not participate, only Brennan, Powell, and Stewart are left. Judging, then, from the
number of Brennan opinions cited in the per curiam, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), the equation of fifth amendment due process with fourteenth amendment equal protection
analysis, 424 U.S. at 93 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (another Brennan
opinion)), and the reliance upon a two-rung, compelling interest standard of review instead of ad hoc
balancing, Justice Brennan is the likely author.
" Karst, supra note 2. I do not propose that Professor Karst would agree with me in every particular
of my approach. Indeed, he is quite clear that in his judgment "the equality principle's prohibition on
government control of speech content is of limited use when the problem is one of censorship by private
broadcasters and newspapers." Id. at 51. He assumes that something like a statute would be necessary
to accomplish access to the print media, and he is not at all sure that he would approve any such statute
in any event. I take the view that a statute is unnecessary, indeed undesirable in most cases. See text at
note 93 infra.
'Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). Here again
I do not suggest that Judge Wright and I would agree completely. I only point out that, like Karst, he
views content discrimination as the "main evil against which rigorous First Amendment scrutiny is
designed to guard." Id. at 1009. In addition, Judge Wright wrote the court of appeals opinion, overturned by the Supreme Court, which would have required broadcasters to sell time for political advertisements. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd,
412 U.S. 94 (1973). I also suspect Judge Wright of principal responsibility for the court of appeals'
per curiam in the campaign finance case. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd in part,
424 U.S. 1 (1975). The opinion's tenor, coupled with Judge Wright's vigorous criticism of the Supreme
Court's decision, see Wright, supra, at 1001 (expressing concern that the Supreme Court's treatment of
the issues "distort[s] our understanding of ourselves and our government"), lead me to conclude that he
was the primary author.
72J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973) [hereinafter cited as J. BARRON, FREEnOM];
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Barron, Access]. For my departures from Professor Barron, see text at notes 81-93 infra.
"'B. SCHMIDT, supra note 3. While Professor Schmidt fairly reports the advantages of access, his
book in full is critical of thinking I consider horizontalist. Accord, Lange, The Role of Access in the
Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1973).
"Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
737 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Emerson, Colonial Intentions]. I rely for my rough appraisal on
Professor Emerson's insistence that the system of free speech "must remain essentially laissez faire," and,
to a lesser extent, upon his assumption that the first amendment permits regulation of broadcasting only
because of the spectrum's physical limitations. Id. at 751-52. On the other hand, Emerson has long
recognized the shortcomings of verticalism, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 627-73, and,
even in his most recent paper, has endorsed the use of antitrust laws to "break up media monopolies."
Emerson, Colonial Intentions, supra, at 752. I count his grudging acceptance of the fairness doctrine as
ambivalent. Id. at 753. At bottom, he is frankly, and understandably, worried.
Like other institutions in our society, the system of freedom of expression does not function
in precisely the way the colonists intended. As we have grown older, bigger, and more complex,
the system has developed flaws, distortions, and malfunctionings. In such a situation the citizenry,
acting through the government, is normally called upon to make adjustments and lend support.
In the case of freedom of expression, however, such intervention by government entails unusual
risks. The paradox of looking to government for regulation of a system that, by definition, is
immune from government control presents one of the most difficult problems of our age.
Id. at 756.
"Freund, The Great Disorder of Speech, 44 AMER. SCHOLAR 541 (1975). The evidence is slim, to
be sure, but to the extent Professor Freund is content to retain the fairness doctrine, so long as the
physical scarcity argument remains respectable, but resists "government's entering wedge" with regard
to "journals of opinion," I think it fair to view him as a verticalist. Id. at 556-58.
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prefer the relative security of verticalism for the present. I place Judge Bazelon
somewhere between the two camps.7 6 Both sides pick and choose from among the
writings of others to find support for their positions. Holmes,77 Chafee,7 s
Meiklejohn, 79 and Kalven s ° are cited in and out of context.
Q: I thought you would come to Barron. Have you now stepped into line
behind him?
A: Not entirely. I must say I admire his courage to propose that we take our
first amendment theory in hand and alter it to address changed circumstances. Less
intrepid men would blindly trust more familiar principles to somehow see us
through. Yet, there are matters upon which Barron and I disagree. To begin, he
leans too heavily upon the revisionist notion that the real value protected by the
first amendment is not that speakers be permitted to speak but that listeners be
"On the one hand, Judge Bazelon has long insisted that the Commission's regulation of broadcasting
is at best suspicious. When in the name of the "public interest" the Commission failed to renew
Reverend McIntyre's license, Bazelon lamented that, whatever we may think of right-wing propaganda,
the Commission's action had "dealt a death blow to the licensee's freedoms of speech and press."
Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
His doubts about the physical scarcity rationale for broadcasting regulation, see text at notes 129-42 infra,
have led him to suggest that any governmental tampering with the content of programming must be
invalid. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring). On the other hand, he is well aware of the problems associated with concentration of
control and the far-reaching issues that now face the nation. He has flirted with limited access and
urged governmental attempts to maintain diversity through content-neutral attacks upon monopoly. See
Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213. See also National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modified, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
'I have already argued that Holmes' marketplace metaphor has about it a distaste for content discrimination. See text at notes 4-7 supra. Judge Wright, too, finds the Abrams dissent useful in building
a case for horizontalism. Wright, supra note 71, at 1004 n.17. On the other hand, Schmidt assumes
that the "free marketplace of ideas" captures what I have characterized as the verticalist tradition.
B. SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 29.
" I have also mentioned Professor Chafee's prescient examination of the problems presented by concentrated control of the media. See note 3 supra. When, however, the Court struck down the newspaper
"right of reply" statute, it found important support in the same work. Said Chafee, "[L]iberty of the
press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper." Z. CI-AFEE,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 633, quoted in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 n.24 (1974). While I find the statute under attack in Tornillo to be far short of an adequate
horizontalist response to the monopoly power of newspapers, see text at notes 90-91 infra, the statement
lifted from Chafee to strike it down plainly reflects a verticalist focus.
' Barron takes key language from Meiklejohn as his point of departure. See text at note 82 infra.
Yet, as I have noted, the cornerstone of Meiklejohn's theory, the proposition that the first amendment
protects only speech associated in some way with the political process, contemplates obvious content discrimination. See text at notes 5-6 supra. In addition, I have to find a vertical focus in his refusal to
recognize protection for advertising and broadcasting. In the first edition of his great essay, he insisted
that radio had no first amendment protection because it was "not engaged in the task of enlarging and
enriching human communication" but rather "in making money." A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 104 (1948).
Introducing the second edition, he lamented that in
the intervening years television had "proved to be even more deadly." A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM, supra note 6, at xvi. While I must agree that "those business controls of communication are,
day by day, year by year, destroying and degrading our intelligence and our taste by the use of instruments which should be employed in educating and uplifting them," id., I hardly conclude that the
interests of free expression can be served by denying commercial speech constitutional protection.
' It was Professor Kalven, of course, who turned our attention to what was to him "a classic distinction in speech theory .. .the distinction between regulations like Robert's Rules of Order and regulation
of content." Kalven, Public Forum, supra note 16, at 23. Similarly, it was Kalven who, while insisting
that the question of government control of broadcasting would be a long time dying, looked further and
perhaps more profitably into the real challenge of mass media regulation. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public
Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & ECON. 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kalven, Broadcasting]. His contributions to the development of horizontalist thinking cannot be overestimated. See
Karst, supra note 2, at 22 (conceding a substantial debt to Kalven's writings).
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allowed to hear."' The emphasis upon correlative rights is adapted from Alexander
Meiklejohn's famous comment that "what is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said." 2 This meant to Meiklejohn
that self-governing men and women require a free flow of information in order to
cast intelligent votes.8 To Barron, it holds a different meaning. It identifies the
fundamental purpose of the first amendment, obscured by its language and the times
in which it was written. In Barron's view, the first amendment was never intended
to protect a right to speak, but rather to ensure the public's right to know."4 In 1791,
the means of communication were dispersed, and the most efficient way to protect
any particular message was to protect the person who spoke it. Now, however,
control of the mass media is concentrated in the few, and protecting those few does
nothing to ensure that the public will hear the messages of those not fortunate
enough to have newspapers and broadcast stations at their disposal. It is necessary,
then, to install new constitutional doctrine that forces the media managers to share
their great power with outsiders."'
Q: You disagree?
A: Yes, with both. Meiklejohn's insistence that free speech provides voters
with the information they need to cast intelligent votes misconceives the way in
which a modern democracy operates. To be sure, ballots are cast at periodic elections, and occasionally the rascals are turned out. Yet the real voting is carried on
between elections-by lobbyists, pressure groups, and anyone else who has a complaint about or a suggestion for the local representative. It is not on those comparatively rare Tuesdays in the fall that Americans most influence their government.
They register their views much more effectively in the push and pull of political
wrangling over issues as they arise.8 6 Free speech, then, is not a means to intelligent
'Barron, Access, supra note 72, at 1663-66. Barron originally relied on then-Judge Burger's opinion
in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966),

finding in that "standing" case an implicit recognition of the public's constitutional right to know. Of
course, Red Lion, see note 65 supra, and a number of other cases decided since Barron's original article
are now more appropriate citations. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (explicitly resting consumers' standing to challenge restrictions on
advertising upon their first amendment rights as "recipients of the information").
"1A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 26, cited in Barron, Access, supra note 72,
at 1653.
83 In

his famous description of a town meeting, he said,
Now, in that method of political self-government, the point of ultimate interest is not the words
of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise
decisions. The voters, therefore, must be made as wise as possible. The welfare of the community
requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They must know what they are
voting about. And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests relevant
to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting. Both facts and interests must
be given in such a way that all the alternative lines of action can be wisely measured in relation
to one another. As the self-governing community seeks, by the method of voting, to gain wisdom
in action, it can find it only in the minds of its individual citizens. If they fail, it fails. That is
why freedom of discussion for those minds may not be abridged.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 26 (emphasis added).
'I
suspect, for example, that Professor Barron would agree with the Fifth Circuit that speech
directed to a single public official in private correspondence and not shared with the world is unprotected.
Givhan, v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated.... U.S ......
99
S. Ct. 693 (1979).

' Barron, Access, supra note 72, at 1641-47 (labeling the laissez-faire underpinnings of Holmes' marketplace metaphor mere romanticism).
" See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976) (criticizing the assumption
implicit in some recent writing that legislation is "instrumental" and rationally pursues some identifiable
objective). In fairness, I hasten to concede that Meiklejohn and others writing by his lead have recog-
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voting; it is voting. Once this is understood, the protection offered by the first
amendment can be placed where it must rest-with the individual speaker.
Q: And Barron?
A: I am as concerned as he is about the monopoly power of the mass communications industry. The problem can be met, however, without denying that the first
amendment establishes a right of free speech. Barron adopts a horizontalist approach
and demands that the media be open to all views. But since he is concerned only
for the right of the public to hear, he is satisfied with theoretically troublesome
measures like the fairness doctrine. s7 So long as conflicting messages are heard, he
cares little who speaks them. To my mind, it is critical that those who genuinely
hold views be permitted to express them in their own words. Surrogates fail to
capture the full force of original speech. Something is lost, and it may often be
the something that determines whether the speech will be believed by its ultimate
audience.8"
Q: Would you argue that straining speech through the minds of others may
frustrate the individual self-fulfillment and safety valve functions of free expression ?89
A: Yes, and I would add this about Professor Barron's views. His idea of
access is, I think, unjustifiably negative. He insists, for example, that in a case like
Tornillo a person who has been attacked in the press must in fairness be permitted
to respond. ° Such a responsive view of access is, in my view, inadequate. It connized that any speech "that participates in the processes of democracy" should have first amendment
protection. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 302 (1978). Accord, Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 INn. L.J. 1 (1971). The great difficulty with Professor Bork is that,
unlike Meiklejohn, he seems unable to grasp the vital connection between political speech and other
forms of expression that contribute, however indirectly, to democratic self-government. Compare
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 257 (insisting that art and
literature inform political judgment and thus are protected) with Bork, supra, at 27 (denying such protection). My views, particularly regarding access to the print media, may startle some. But rest assured
I will have no part of a first amendment theory that places no constitutional value on the expression
apparent in painting, sculpture, and poetry. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231
(1977) (recognizing that "expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-" is entitled to first amendment protection).
s"Compare, Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's
"Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 31 (1964) and Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REa. 1 (1961) with text at notes
95-111 infra.
' Mill put the argument best.
Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers,
presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the
way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must
be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and
do their very utmost for them.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (McCallum ed. 1947), quoted in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 392 n.18 (1969) (perhaps suggesting that fairness doctrine responsibilities can and should be met
by offering direct access to outsiders or, perhaps again, simply defending approval of "personal attack"
rules, which demand such access). Cf. Canby, Programming in Response to the Community: The
Broadcast Consumer and the First Amendment, 55 TEx. L. REV. 67, 81-83 (1976) (contending that
recognition of a right to hear may lead to "consumer sovereignty" and a regime in which there is a right
to say only what the public wants to hear).
'See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 6-7; Karst, supra note 2, at 23-26 (contending that
the equality principle is vital to the protection of these and other values).
" Brief for Appellee, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Professor
Barron made the argument in the Supreme Court. Id. at 242.
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templates that stronger voices will speak first and loudest-that they will not only
choose the issues to be discussed but ensure that they have their say whether or
not dissenters are ever heard in response. 9' Finally, Barron is intentionally elusive
about whether his right of access is based upon statute or the first amendment itself.92 It is one thing to contend merely that the first amendment will permit government to take affirmative action to equalize access to the media and that, accordingly, such things as "right of reply" statutes are constitutional. It is quite another
to argue that the first amendment of its own force demands that meaningful access
be provided, with or without the aid of a statute. The latter is my position.9 3 I do not
know that Professor Barron shares it.
Q: You think a statute is unnecessary?
A: That is precisely my view. I think the focus of the first amendment is
horizontal, that it mandates an opportunity for all to speak and speak meaningfully.
Q: Do you find positive statutory enactments designed to establish access invalid?
A: Not in all cases. I have already said that I find "right of reply" statutes
misconceived. Similarly, the Commission's "personal attack" and "equal time" rules
depend upon an initial attack or appearance to trigger access. 4
Q: That is not true of the fairness doctrine. 5
A: No. But it raises still more troubling matters. The fairness doctrine is the
' Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.) (noting that negative mechanisms such as the fairness doctrine leave the greatest power in
the hands of the advertiser who first gains access to the airways for his or her slant on important issues).
See also Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85
HAsv. L. REv. 768, 775 (1972) (pointing out that "it is sheer chance that any individual who has heard
one side of a controversial broadcast will be in his chair to hear the required reply."). But see Wilderness
Soc'y and Friends of the Earth, 31 F.C.C.2d 729, 742 (1971) (Johnson, C., dissenting in part)
(contending that the same audience can be reached by requiring licensees to broadcast response messages
at the same hours and with the same force and regularity as the original programs).
On another level, of course, there is the difficulty of paying for replies. If those seeking to respond
can afford the going rate, the broadcaster (or newspaper in a case such as Tornillo) can only complain
that unpopular replies may offend customers and distract attention from adjacent offerings. See Jaffe,
supra, at 780. All things considered, that seems a small matter and perhaps need not concern us. On
the other hand, if those who wish to respond cannot pay all or even part of the standard charge, and a
"submarket rate system" must be established to avoid obvious wealth discrimination, Note, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 689, 695 (1972), enormous administrative difficulties appear.
"See I. BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 72, at 66-74 (toying with arguments put forth by others that
the Bill of Rights should be reinterpreted to reach ostensibly private monopoly power, but turning promptly
to various bases for federal legislative action); Barron, Access, supra note 72, at 1669 (recognizing that
the former proposition contemplates a "rabid theory of state action").
"3See text at notes 182-207 infra.
" Roughly, the "personal attack" rule requires broadcasters to offer access time to identified persons
or groups whose "honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities" are attacked on the air during
the presentation of views on a "controversial issue of public importance." 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1978).
See Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (opinion of Wright, J.);
Personal Attacks: Political Editorials, 8 F.C.C.2d 721 (1967). The "equal time" rule is codified in
§ 315 of the 1934 Act. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). With some notable exceptions, the rule requires any
licensee that permits one legally qualified candidate use of the station to afford "equal opportunities" to
all other qualified candidates for that office. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Use
of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832 (1970). But see 47 U.S.C. §
312(a) (7) (1976) (permitting the Commission to revoke a broadcasting license for willful or repeated
failure to afford reasonable access to legally qualified candidates for federal office).
"sSee The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report] (retaining the two
elements of the doctrine-to treat issues of public importance and to afford an opportunity for conflicting
views to be heard).
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Commission's principal response to the tension between the vertical and horizontal
approaches. As such, it is plainly inadequate. Indeed, in practical application it
can snuff out rather than enhance free speech. 6 At the outset, the Commission
senses the shortcomings of verticalist theory in coping with mass communications.
If broadcast licensees are allowed complete freedom to present what programming
they choose, the views of broadcasters, or perhaps their advertising clients, will
dominate the airways." In order to avoid offending viewers, broadcasters will tend
98
to limit treatment of public issues to those about which there is little controversy.
To prevent that happening, the fairness doctrine departs from verticalism and demands that the airways be open to other issues and views. Yet rather than adopting
the horizontalist position, which contemplates a right of access for outsiders, the
fairness doctrine strikes a rough compromise. It demands that issues of concern
to others be treated and that all sides be heard, but it rests responsibility for that
treatment entirely with licensees. Broadcasters are told that they must devote reasonable time to the coverage of controversial public issues and that they must afford
an opportunity for contrasting views to be heard. Nothing is said, however, about
permitting outsiders access to the microphone to express their opinions in their
own way. 9 This is theoretical nonsense. To begin, it censors broadcasters. It not
only deters them from stating their own views in the first instance but compounds
the error by coercing them into expressing views they may find abhorent. A governmental demand that a citizen speak is no less objectionable than a requirement
that he or she remain silent, 0 0 and, of course, by relying on the presentation of
dissenting views by broadcasters instead of those who hold those opinions, it discounts the value of speech by those who truly believe in what they say. Again, this
" See Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). See generally Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red
Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539 (1978).
' It is well-documented that the content of television programming is in large measure dictated by
the advertisers who bid for scarce time. M. WEINBERG, TV IN AMERICA: THE MORALITY OF HARD CASH
(1962). See G. SELDES, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1935) (dealing with the print media). Advertisers, in
turn, bid highest for network programming that appeals to the largest audience, even at the expense of
sizable minorities. R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION

10, 49-50 (1973)

[hereinafter cited as NOLL, PECK & McGOWAN].

See M. SEIDEN, WHO CONTROLS THE

MEDIA? 160-62 (1974) (describing network reliance upon Nielsen measurements).
" See, e.g., Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (reviewing a West Virginia station's policy of
virtually ignoring the debate over strip-mining).
" On the contrary, "the format and the choice of a spokesman for the competing views are left to
the licensee's discretion." Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
While the Commission has said that licensees should make reasonable efforts to allow presentations by
"genuine partisans who actually believe in what they are saying," Fairness Report, supra note 95, at
15, the only requirement under the fairness doctrine is a good faith offer to present opposing views in a
fashion determined by the licensee.
This does not mean, however that the Commission intends to dictate the selection of a
particular spokesman or particular format or indeed that partisan spokesmen must be presented
in every instance. We do not believe that it is either appropriate or feasible for a governmental
agency to make decisions as to what is desirable in each situation. In cases involving personal
attacks and political campaigns, the natural opposing spokesmen are relatively easy to identify.
This is not the case, however, with the majority of public controversies. Ordinarily, there are a
variety [sic] of spokesmen and formats which could reasonably be deemed to be appropriate. We
believe that the public is best served by a system which allows individual broadcasters considerable
discretion in selecting the manner of coverage, the appropriate spokesmen, and the techniques of
production and presentation.
Id. at 16. See also Obligations of Broadcast Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27 (1970)
(requiring licensees to notify specific individuals of an opportunity to present opposing views but still
failing to demand that those individuals be allowed to speak for themselves over the air).
'See
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and cases cited in note 55 supra.
MASS
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is Barron's mistake-the assumption that it is unimportant that some speakers are
silenced so long as others are permitted to state the same views."' Most fundamentally, the fairness doctrine is not content neutral. Government selects the topics
for discussion and simply presents them to both willing and unwilling speakers. 1 2
Q: You deny, then, that the fairness doctrine is horizontalist?
A: I think it merely reflects the Commission's vague suspicion that traditional,

verticalist theory is inadequate in the face of concentration of control of the mass
media and that government may legitimately become involved in expression in
order to open important forums to the discussion of competing views. It is not,
however, a content-neutral policy that merely structures the use of a public forum
for the expression of all. As a horizontalist, I will permit, even demand, that government play the role of referee. I object, however, to orders from government that
in the name of equal opportunity some speakers will be required to voice views
they do not hold, but in the name of frugality others will be silenced. It is no
answer that the doctrine only requires that outsiders' views be heard and that it is
the broadcasters who choose to comply by themselves mouthing the words of their
detractors. For the fact is that the Commission contemplates nothing else. Its longstanding acceptance of industry practices can only indicate that the usual means of
compliance is precisely what is expected."'
Q: Is fairness better than nothing? 0 .
A: Quite the contrary. Theoretical objections to one side, the fairness doctrine
contributes to the mindless banality of broadcast journalism. 0 5 The initial requirement that public issues be treated is enforced only rarely. Attention is usually
"os
See note 88 and accompanying text supra. Cf. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 6,
at 26 (suggesting that a town meeting moderator should not waste time by permitting each of twenty
like-minded citizens an opportunity to deliver the same message).
"Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 148-49 (1967).
103To be sure, it can be argued that by forcing a broadcaster to devote time to an outsider's message,
even an access doctrine would suppress the licensee's speech to the extent alternative expression is preempted. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974). The argument,
however, ignores the facts. Both broadcasters and newspapers now have plenty of room for the offerings
of outsiders. See note 173 infra. In any event, the burden is slight and, most important, content neutral.
Kenneth Karst offers a simple illustration.
Consider, for example, a law requiring newspapers to accept paid editorial advertising. The
burden on the newspaper's production would be minimal, and more than offset by advertising
revenue. The publisher would be commanded by law to publish something it chose not to print.
But: (a) the government would not identify subjects worth discussing; that choice would be left
to those who seek to advertise; (b) there would be no government supervision to assure "fair"
coverage of any issue; (c) there would be no regulation of message content; and (d) the publisher could dissociate itself from any advertising message, both by marginal notations and by
editorial statements.
Karst, supra note 2, at 52 n.165.
104 See Emerson, Colonial Intentions, supra note 74, at 753 (expressing dissatisfaction with the doctrine
but urging its retention nevertheless); Jaffe, The Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time, Reply to Personal
Attacks, and the Local Service Obligation: Implications of Technological Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV.
550, 557 (1968) (suggesting that present doctrines be retained because they "do not do great harm and
they may do some good").
° See Geller, Does Red Lion Square With Tornillo? 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 477 (1975) (proposing
that the doctrine's leveling effect be mitigated by deferring complaints for consideration en masse at
renewal time).
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focused on the second requirement that contrasting views be presented.' 06 It is
permissible, of course, for broadcasters to pursue one side of a question in one program and then deal with opposing views in a later broadcast. But in practice broadcasters attempt to avoid fairness doctrine complaints by spending time in every
program on the opinions of others.' 0 7 The result is an endless stream of bland
programming and commentary, studded with the familiar "on the one hand ...on
the other hand" form of reporting." 8 No argument is presented thoroughly or
persuasively; all are set forth in a matter-of-fact fashion without distinction. Every
witness is refuted by a competing witness, and in the end the viewer is abandoned.
Every argument and idea is as good as the next one, one side of a debate appears
no more engaging than another, and the only course is bewildered ambivalence-the
frustration that feeds an apathetic populace. I would prefer, and I believe the first
amendment demands, the vigor and excitement of hard-hitting investigative journalism and strong-minded commentary-the sort of expression that says something
and leaves it to the viewer to compare what is said in one program with what appears in another. Of course, I do not suggest that broadcasters should mislead
viewers by withholding evidence or neglecting important perspectives. I rely on
professional journalists to report upon events with clarity and integrity. My judgment is simply that they cannot do that meaningfully if government requires them
to report all possible sides and viewpoints.' 09 In the broadcast world I would
establish, people with something to say would have an opportunity to say it-for
themselves. This is what the first amendment means-what it must mean.
Q: What if the Commission were to substitute an access doctrine for fairness?" 0
" Simmons, The Problem of "Issue" in the Administration of the Fairness Doctrine, 65 CALIF. L. REV.

546, 548 (1977); Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controversial Issues: The Forgotten
Hall of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 137 (1975). But see Patsy Mink, 59
F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (holding that strip mining is a matter of such local importance that a station
serving a West Virginia community must treat it in some fashion); Gary Soucie, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 750-51
(1970) (commenting that some national issues may be so important that they cannot be completely
ignored).
55

' See, e.g., Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), application for review denied, 44
F.C.C.2d 1045 (1974), rev'd sub nom. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, reversal
vacated, 516 F.2d 1156, second reversal vacated, 516 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reviewing Edwin

Newman's attempts to "balance" an account of private pension programs by concluding his documentary
with the caveat that some such programs are not so bad as others). See Simmons, supra note 106, at
570-78 (examining the NBC case).

"0The recently retired Eric Sevareid was a master at constructing commentary to avoid second-rung
fairness obligations. See R. CIRINo, DON'T BLAME THE PEOPLE 76-77 (1971) (accusing Sevareid of
skillfully "covering up editorial viewpoint and personal attack").
" Of course, itis hardly necessary for the Commission to take discrete action against a licensee.
Indeed, the Commission has only once relied on the fairness doctrine to refuse a license renewal, and then
it found make weight arguments to mitigate the first amendment sting. Brandywine-Main Line Radio,
24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), petition for reconsideration denied, 27 F.C.C.2d 565 (1971), afl'd, 473 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). Regulation by "lifted eyebrow" is enormously more
effective. Kalven, Broadcasting,supra note 80, at 19-23 (providing illustrations of the "dossier technique");
Robinson, supra note 102, at 119-21 (describing the "in terrorem aspect of periodic renewal").
"°The Court held in CBS only that the first amendment and the 1934 Act do not now require
broadcasters to sell time to outsiders. Indeed, the Chief Justice suggested that in the future "Congress or
the Commission-or the broadcasters-may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both
practicable and desirable." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131
(1973). Model statutes have been proposed, e.g., Comment, A Proposed Statutory Right to Respond to
Environmental Advertisements: Access to the Airways After CBS v. Democratic National Committee,
69 Nw. L. REv. 234 (1974); Comment, Right of Access to the Broadcast Media for Paid Editorial Advertising-A Plea to Congress, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 258 (1974); but to date the Commission has remained
doubtful. But see National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(remanding for further consideration of an access scheme).
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A: I would be pessimistic. Of course, I cannot say that an access scheme that
avoids the pitfalls of present law cannot be established. Inasmuch as I propose that
the first amendment itself mandates access, it would be illogical to contend that the
Commission, the Congress, or even state legislatures cannot assist in the effort. The
commerce clause, section five of the fourteenth amendment, and, in the case of state
legislatures, the police power are ready sources of legislative authority. 1 ' My only
concern is that the Court, charged with interpreting the constitutional mandate,
should not defer to administrative or legislative decision-making. Rules or statutes
can be helpful, particularly in drawing lines, 1 2 but they cannot control. The first
amendment itself controls, and, consequently, responsibility for determining what
access is necessary and sufficient is lodged firmly with the Court."'
Q: Perhaps that is as it should be. For it is the Court that has assumed responsibility for individual liberty generally-at least since the 1937 realignment.14
A: I agree. The fate of individual liberty cannot be left in the hands of a
majoritarian will that can so easily become a tyranny to stamp out dissent. Only
the judicial department can withstand the weight of majoritarian power."' I do
not discount the difficulty of the task; it is enormous. But there is simply no place
else to turn but to the Court.
Q: I think it may be time to turn your attention to the mass media cases. I
gather from what you have said that you would have the Court fashion an access
doctrine from the first amendment of its own force. While access to places such as
parks and the public streets might provide some minimal protection for minority
views, I suspect you would demand access to more meaningful forums. If I am
correct and you mean to contend for access to the mass media, then perhaps we
should begin with a familiar question-whether there is some satisfying basis for
distinguishing broadcasting from the print media.
A: An adequate answer demands an historical perspective. I am sure you
'See Head v. Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (rejecting an argument that the
Communications Act preempts state regulation of broadcasting); J. BARRON, FREEDOM, supra note 72, at
67-68 (proposing that section five of the fourteenth amendment would be a more forthright basis);
Address by Commissioner Cox, ABA Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities Annual Meeting
(August 1969) (assuming that the commerce clause provides the necessary authority).
"' See note 167 and accompanying text infra. It may be recalled that when Judge Wright first held
that broadcasters must sell time to political advertisers he remanded to the Commission for the development of workable standards and procedures. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 450 F.2d
642, 663-65 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
...
Judge Bazelon's opinion in the diversification case approaches what I have in mind. Inasmuch as
the Commission decision under review rested upon policy judgment rather than fact-finding, and
touched upon first amendment rights, he merely paid lip service to a relaxed standard of review and
went on to a "searching" examination. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d
938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modified, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). See also Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d
594, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the Commission has no special
expertise in constitutional interpretation), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
' See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
..Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952). Fred
Friendly's unnerving description of the way in which the fairness doctrine has been manipulated for
political advantage is proof enough that freedom of speech requires perpetual judicial protection.
F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GuYs, THE BAD Guys, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1976) (reporting that the
doctrine might never have developed as it did if the Roosevelts had not needed a weapon against George
A. Richards and the Kennedy Administration had not used it to counter opposition to the nuclear testban treaty). See also Bazelon, supra note 76 (expressing concern over Nixon staffers' attempts to best
the media).
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understand that when broadcasting was introduced early in this century no one
considered it to be a vehicle for protected expression." 6 It had its military and commercial uses, and most importantly it soon became one of our chief sources of entertainment.' 17 The very existence of the federal government's licensing scheme,
established as early as 1912,"8 proves the point. If broadcasting had been thought
to be speech, such a system would have been condemned as an invalid previous
restraint." 9 This is the intellectual history of broadcasting. At least until recently,
it has combined with the commercial speech "exception" 12 to deprive broadcasting
of significant first amendment protection. It accounts for our collective tolerance of
government censorship, which is apparent now in the statute prohibiting the use
of profanity on the air' 2 ' and the ban on cigarette advertisements, 12 2 and which is
threatened anew in various proposals to restrict or eliminate advertising addressed
23
to children.
" Bazelon, supra note 76, at 219-20 (recalling that prior to 1960 news reporting on the air consisted
of rebroadcasting materials prepared for the print media); Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 15-18
(suggesting that if broadcasting had had its own Zenger case, a separate tradition for the electronic
media might not have developed). See generally F. FRIENDLY, DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR
CONTROL (1967) (describing the growth of television news programs).
' See generally E. BARNOUW, A ToWER OF BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1961); W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REGULATIONS (1971).
" See L. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION (1932).
a B. SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 125-26. See Comment, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The
Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 733-40 (1974) (apparently proposing
that the licensing scheme should even now be declared invalid as a prior restraint).
'E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See generally Redish, The First Amendment
in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GRO. WASH. L. REV. 429
(1971).
'm 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
See Note, Morality
and the Broadcast Media: A4 Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV.
664 (1971); Note, Filthy Words, The FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity,
61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975); Note, Oflensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343 (1970).
1- 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). The ban was upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Att'y Gen., 405
U.S. 1000 (1972). Now that the Court has accorded commercial expression a greater measure of first
amendment protection, see notes 42-43 supra, it may be argued that one of the grounds for the decision
has been cut away, and it now can stand, if at all, solely on the supposed distinction between broadcasting and the print media. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 774 (1976) (citing Capital Broadcasting but commenting that "the special problems of
the electronic broadcast media" were not in issue). Accord, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
384 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975). But see Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 712 n.6 (1977) (Powell, J.,concurring) (suggesting that restrictions on commercial
advertising may be "especially appropriate" when the electronic media are used to carry the message).
On the other hand, there are indications that the Court considers commercial advertising less valuable
than other forms of protected expression and, for that reason, it may be regulated in a manner that would
be invalid in the case of, for example, a political speech. If the Court should determine that the dangers
posed by cigarette ads warrant special treatment, particularly when they are addressed to children, the
ban might conceivably withstand scrutiny even under the more recent commercial speech cases. P. Kurland
& D. Polsby, An Opinion as to the Validity of a Proposed Federal Trade Commission Ban on Children's
Television Advertising 26-29 (submitted to Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc.) (on file with the Kansas
Law Review). My own view, of course, is that it constitutes unconstitutional censorship. Indeed, I should
have thought that the tobacco industry's foes would agree. It must be recalled that tobacco interests
actively supported the outright ban on their ads-on the theory that complete silence from all sides was
preferable to the Commission's previous policy of applying the fairness doctrine to cigarette commercials.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Dissenting in Capital Broadcasting, Judge Wright
pointed out that, after Banzhaf, further tobacco industry ads served only to trigger antismoking messages
tending to reduce cigarette consumption. 333 F. Supp. at 587-88. The industry was only too glad to take
its ads off the air in order to shut up antismoking forces. While I have my doubts about the fairness
doctrine, I do look upon the experience with cigarette advertisements as solid proof that an access doctrine
is vital to the free discussion of public issues.
"'E.g., Children's Television Report & Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) (surveying broadcasters' "self-regulation"), afl'd, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(examining the more restrictive controls one organization of parents would establish). See also Notice of
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Q: Will you defend profanity in the presence of impressionable youth? 12 4
A: Certainly not. Parents can and should teach their children to express themselves without sordid allusions.
Q: Advertisements pushing cancer sticks and sugary, tooth-decaying sweets? 12
A: I find such commercial practices loathsome. At best, they teach children the
art of nagging-a technique that is far too effective in most American households. 1'
At worst, they bring death at an early age. 27 Yet, like fascist and communist
harangues, the most abhorrent ads are protected by the first amendment. Any effort
to restrict advertising out of fear for its consequences must fail as content discrimination. We can hardly snuff out speech we disapprove. The answer to bad
speech is more speech. Of course, the regulation of false or misleading advertising
is another matter. I think fraud in advertising can be punished in much the same
way we penalize it in other commercial transactions and in the law of contract. 8
Q: I am afraid it is not so simple as that. You must concede that government
originally established its regulatory scheme in order to reduce frequency interference.
The critical fact is that the electromagnetic spectrum has physical limits. 29 It is
not available to all but must be divided among competing users. As Justice Frankfurter put it in the NBC case thirty-five years ago, "[r]egulation of radio was . . . as
vital to its development as traffic control was to the development of the automobile."" 30 Government was forced to intervene to eliminate the chaos of interference. "With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard." 13 ' That is the conventional wisdom." 2 Do you mean to reject it?
Proposed Rulemaking, 43 Fed. Reg.
TELEVISION ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN

children).

17,967 (1978); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON
(1978) (proposing an absolute ban on advertising addressed to

1" Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (permitting the suppression of materials sold to
children that would not be obscene if distributed to adults).
" Concurring in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), Justice Powell saw "no reason
to cast any doubt on the authority of the State to impose carefully tailored restrictions designed to serve
legitimate governmental concerns as to the effect of commercial advertising on the young." Id. at 712.
'"See Ward & Wackman, Television Advertising and Intrajamily Influence: Children's Purchase
Influence Attempts and Parental Yielding, in IV U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, TELEVISION
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 516 (1972).
" See Larus & Brother Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971) (approving the Commission's
judgment that the detrimental effects of cigarette smoking have been sufficiently established that a
licensee may consider the matter "beyond controversy"). But see Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) (pointing out that cigarette advertisements
are successful only in promoting brand loyalty and not in encouraging smoking in general).
" See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-69 n.31 (1976) (dicta) (commenting
that FTC regulation of advertising has "long been recognized"). Jacob Siegel Co. v. FCC, 327 U.S. 608
(1946); Warner-Lambert v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978)
(approving an order for corrective advertising); FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976) (holding that the first amendment does not protect
false or misleading advertisements). Memorandum from Albert H. Kramer, Director of the United
States Bureau of Consumer Research, to the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union
(October 4, 1978) (defending FTC proposals regarding advertising judged to be misleading to children)
(on file with the Kansas Law Review). See generally Developments in the Law--Deceptive Advertising,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967).
" Two standard casebooks contain brief explanations of the spectrum's physical characteristics and
related allocation issues. M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 536-54 (1977); H. JONES, REGULATED
INDUSTRIES, 926-32 (2d ed. 1976).
'a National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
'Id. at 212.
..Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). More recently, the Commission has
put it this way:
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A: I do. That is, I reject the physical scarcity rationale as a justification for
the regulation of broadcasting as distinguished from other media in which control
is concentrated. I deny that it is any longer the conventional wisdom. On the
contrary, those who have examined the issue in recent years have uniformly dismissed the scarcity rationale out of hand.' 3 I am thinking not only of economists,
who view scarcity of spectrum space as no different from scarcity of other valuable
resources such as printing presses and trees. 34 Others have identified the real problem as concentration of control and recognized that concentration occurs in all
communications media and not simply broadcasting. 13 5 There are, for example,
many more broadcasting stations than daily newspapers in major communications
markets and the influence of the three broadcast networks exceeds even that of the
great wire services.'3 0 In broadcasting the physical limits of the spectrum surely
contribute to concentration, though I would not minimize the influence of Commission regulations that tend to restrict the availability of spectrum space to the
media that most need it. 137 In the newspaper business economic barriers play the
largest role. 13 8 Still, the inevitable consequence in both fields is concentration of
control. I fail to see the basis for attaching constitutional significance to the cause of
that concentration. 3 9
This scarcity principle is not predicated upon a comparison between the number of broadcast
stations and the number of daily newspapers in a given market. The true measure of scarcity
is in terms of the number of persons who wish to broadcast and, in Justice White's language,
there are still "substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to allocate."
Fairness Report, supra note 95, at 4 n.4 (citation omitted).
" Indeed, even the Red Lion briefs made a persuasive case against physical scarcity as a justification
for broadcast regulation. The Court acknowledged the facts but decided on balance that the prudent
course was to embrace the scarcity rationale until it becomes untenable. 395 U.S. at 396-401. Accord,
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
"E.g., H. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE (1971); B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
91 (1975); Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and
Economic Issues, 41 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 161 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Coase, Economic Issues].
See also Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1959).
'E.g.,
Bazelon, supra note 76, at 238 (insisting that the "problem" is not "scarcity" but "simple,
old-fashioned concentration of economic power").
"'R. NIXON, TRENDS IN NEWSPAPER OWNERSHI
(1968). See NOLL, PECK & MCGOWAN, supra note
97, at 15-16, 49-53; Blake & Blum, Network Television Rate Practices: A Case Study in the Failure of
Social Control of Price Discrimination, 74 YALE L.J. 1339 (1965); Bryant, Historical and Social Aspects
of Concentration of Program Control in Television, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 610 (1969).
" See Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications Commission,
63 GEo. L.J. 705 (1975) (describing the Commission's short-sighted decision to assign television to the
inadequate VHF band and subsequent hesitancy to shift to the more adequate UHF band). See also
Barrow & Manelli, Communications Technology-A Forecast of Change, Part 1, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 205 (1969).
'B.
OWEN, supra note 134, at 34-37 (concluding that even with an expenditure of millions it is
virtually impossible to establish a daily newspaper that can compete with the existing giants). But see
Daniel, Right of Access to Mass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First Amendment, 48 TEx.
L. REV. 783, 789 (1970) (recalling that Norman Mailer and Edwin Facher established the Village Voice
with $10,000 between them).
"A former Commissioner has made the following unremarkable point:
The arguments usually made to distinguish broadcasting scarcity from newspaper scarcity are
that broadcasting is limited by the electromagnetic spectrum, whereas the number of newspapers
is not limited by any natural phenomenon, and that broadcasting facilities are licensed by the government while newspapers are not. These arguments are based on differences between the media
but not on differences that are necessarily significant with respect to the first amendment and the
right of the public to free expression. So far as the opportunity for utterance of all views is
concerned, it does not make any difference whether facilities are limited by natural forces or economic forces.
Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 278,
295-96 (1969).
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Q: I suspected you would take the position you have regarding scarcity, but can
you as easily dismiss other rationales offered for distinguishing broadcasting from
the print media?
A: Let me take them in turn. To begin, I certainly can dismiss the argument
that an assertion of government ownership of the spectrum somehow makes expression over the airways unique and therefore regulable."4 ° I will concede that the
Communications Act expressly avoids creating property interests in broadcast
licenses and accordingly retains the spectrum as a government preserve. 4 1 But the
concession leads nowhere. Broadcasters use a public resource to send their signals.
Can it be denied that newspaper delivery trucks use the public streets? If use of
public property, the radio spectrum, or social overhead capital somehow justifies
governmental intervention, then it seems to me that newspapers can be regulated
just as can broadcasters. Now, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am prepared
to argue that the airways are a public forum and that government is very much
responsible for keeping them open for free expression. I simply reject the notion
that a theory of public ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum can justify regu42
lation of broadcasters that would be unconstitutional if applied to newspapers.
Q: I want to explore that last comment in a moment, but first I would like
you to deal with other rationales offered for broadcast regulation. For example, is
there no basis for singling out broadcasting because its signals may reach a captive
audience?
A: I know that Judge Bazelon once proposed that,' 43 but I really think it
proves too much. Certainly it may be easier for readers to pass over offensive
articles and advertisements in a newspaper purchased at the corner drugstore than
it is for television viewers to avoid disturbing material thrust upon them from
a screen fixed in the living room.'
And only the deaf escape what comes from a
radio dangling from the neck of a passing workman. But I would limit the captive
audience argument to cases in which the victim of offensive expression has no
retreat at all. We must realize that freedom of expression for us all necessarily
14
contemplates self-protection for the weak of heart. 5
Q: But television invades the privacy of the home. You may reasonably insist
' Robinson, supra note 102, at 152 (labeling the spectrum itself as an "artificial construct" not
capable of being "owned" by anyone).
"47 U.S.C. § 304 (1976). See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (holding that
no broadcaster has a vested interest in a license).
'" Cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 n.80 (D.C. Cir.) (summarily rejecting the
"ownership" rationale), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
"'Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
1 See Note, Illusion or Deception: The Use of "Props" and "Mock-ups" in Television Advertising,
72 YALE L.J. 145 (1962).
' Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (holding that in a pluralistic society citizens are necessarily the captives of many disturbing
messages and that in the ordinary case the burden falls on the individual to avoid further difficulty by
diverting his or her eyes). Even when the privacy of the home is at stake, the ability of government to
restrict expression must be closely circumscribed. It is one thing to hold, as the Court did in Rowan v.
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), that government can validly assist individuals in maintaining
the privacy of their homes by removing names from the mailing lists of offensive publications on the
request of the addressee, and quite another to propose that government can take the initiative and
prevent materials deemed on some objective standard to be offensive from ever reaching an audience for
acceptance or rejection. In the latter case, the individual viewer can protect himself or herself simply
by changing channels.
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that adults who wish to avoid offensive programming turn the dial or leave the
room, but you must consider children who cannot choose for themselves. Television
is viewed incessantly by children and program schedules are often unreliable and
misleading. Even if they were not, parents would be unable to restrict their children to programs thought to be safe. Indeed, some parents use the boob tube as an
electronic babysitter.14 6
A: My response is predictable. For my part, parents can fairly be expected to
police their own children. Government can hardly be asked to lift that traditional
burden from them.
Q: You said the captive audience argument proves too much.
A: It does. It recognizes that broadcasting can be something more than the
routine of silly police drama, game shows, movie reruns, and bland news reporting
and political commentary. It can be amusing, informative, distressing, stimulating,
and even outrageous. I should have thought that sound public policy under the
first amendment would foster "robust" expression rather than suppress it in the
name of protection for those who do not wish to know. Yes, the captive audience
argument proves too much. It proves that broadcasting is invested with the very
first amendment values we want most to preserve.
Q: There is at least one further argument.
A: I know. I have left it for last not because it is least important but because
it is the most persuasive of all. I take it you are thinking of the so-called "power"
theory, 14 7 which posits that regulation of broadcasting is justified because of the
nature of television as a "cool" medium, 14 s the enormous amount of time Americans
spend in front of the screen, 149 and our growing dependence upon it for communication with the larger society.' 50 Put most bluntly, the effects of television viewing from infancy run deep. We do not yet know how deep.' 5' The safest course
at present may be benign regulation in order to maintain control when the human
consequences of dependence upon broadcasting begin to appear. This is the real
reason so many of us tolerate the regulation of television and cable, which shares
15 2
broadcasting's power if not its physical characteristics. '
'See
Lyle, Television in Daily Life: Patterns of Use (Overview), in IV U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDuc. & WELFARE, TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1 (1972) (reporting that most television viewing is

opportunistic and unplanned, that sixth graders are in the audience through most of the prime viewing
hours, and that a majority of mothers may make no effort to restrict the viewing of first graders). But
see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (striking down a statute banning from all readers books
considered inappropriate for children).
7
' See Freund, supra note 75, at 556-59; Bazelon, supra note 76, at 220-2 1.
' M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA-THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1965).
" LoSciuto, A National Inventory of Television Viewing Behavior, in IV U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 33 (1972) (reporting that virtually every American
has access to a television set and that by one account the median viewing period is just under three
hours per day).
"'°See B. ROPER, A TEN-YEAR VIEW OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS
MEDIA 2 (1968), cited in Stone, Sources of Most News: Evidence and Inference, 14 J. BROADCASTING 1

(1969) (reporting that more than half the Americans surveyed said they depended upon television for
most of their news).
"mSee Baran, On the Impact of the New Communications Media Upon Social Values, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 244 (1969); Bazelon, supra note 76, at 221.
" But see Robinson, Introduction and General Background, in DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION
1, 5 (P. McAvoy ed. 1977)

(recognizing that federal regulation of cable has "grown in scope and

568
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Q: It is more than that. Television may twist the events it reports to us and
thus distort the only picture of reality we have."'3 In addition, it tends to influence
events themselves. There are obvious examples. Cameras in the courtroom may
54
mean the difference between conviction and acquittal.1
A: I understand the concerns, but have they not always been with us-in another
form, perhaps? The idea of free speech is dangerous. There is nothing new in that.
All this comes down to an undirected fear that broadcasting will make too great a
difference too soon. Yet it is hardly a purpose of the first amendment to preserve
the status quo. I will concede that I am troubled by what changes the age of mass
communications may bring, but I am not so satisfied with the world as it is that
I am prepared to place controls on a medium of expression in order to dilute its
effectiveness. In this perhaps I am a traditionalist after all. I believe that the answer
lies in more speech, not less. Of course, we can legitimately recognize the difference
cameras make and justify excluding them from some trials; but we cannot, on the
same reasoning, attempt to prevent political posturing by excluding them from
legislative chambers.
Q: Am I to understand that you find no justification for distinguishing between
broadcasting and the print media and that, accordingly, the 1934 Communications
Act is unconstitutional?
A: I need not go so far or, indeed, in that direction. The Communications Act
is unobjectionable to the extent it assigns frequencies to avoid interference. If Justice
Frankfurter had stopped there in NBC, 5 ' I would have had no quarrel with him.
Q: But he could not stop there. Once it is granted that government will license,
attention must turn to the criteria of choice between competing applicants, all of
whom have the technical capacity to operate a broadcasting station. The problem
is the familiar one of allocating scarce resources. What would you have government
do? Auction licenses to the highest bidder?"5 6 Offer them to the first applicants
to appear? Draw lots? 15 7 Given the extraordinary import of the licensing decision,
it seems only sane to propose that licenses should issue to applicants who, judged by
intensity in direct proportion to the threat, perceived or actual, which cable services pose to established
over-the-air broadcasters"). Of course, since CATV relies on coaxial cables to deliver signals to its
subscribers, and the channel capacity of such cables is enormous, the physical scarcity rationale asserted
for regulating broadcasting would seem inapposite with respect to the control of cable. Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). Nevertheless, the
Commission has launched a number of regulatory forays into the cable field. Compare United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) and United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
178 (1968) (approving regulation "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting") with National Cable Television
Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (disapproving certain rate-fixing). See generally S. RIVKxN,
CABLE TELEVISION: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1973). Recently, new legislation, emphasizing
access, has been proposed. See Note, The Proposed Cable Communications Act of 1975: A Recommendation for Comprehensive Regulation, 1975 DUKE L.J. 93.
"' See, e.g., ASPEN NOTEBOOK ON GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA 12-50 (W. Rivers & M. Nyhan eds.
1973) [hereinafter cited as ASPEN NOTEBOOK]. See also Wood, Television As Dream, in TELEVISION AS
A CULTURAL FORCE 17 (R. Adler & D. Cater eds. 1976).
" See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
' Nat'l Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
Coase, Economic Issues, supra note 134.
1H Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1971); Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 240 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Robinson, Essay].
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objectively determinable factors, promise to operate in the public interest. This is
the way Congress solved the allocation problem in the 1934 Act, and Justice Frankfurter, who fully understood that the Commission had to inquire about programming
content to make its decisions, simply approved the inevitable.
A: You are correct only to a point. I agree, of course, that it is necessary to
allocate licenses, and like you I shrink from throwing the matter to the selfishness
of the market or the sheer chance of a lottery. I have no objection to a system that
judges applicants according to their appraisal of the programming needs of the
community they wish to serve, their intended response to those needs, and the
broadcast time they expect to devote to commercial profit-making."' 8 Indeed, I
applaud efforts to use the licensing process as a vehicle for diversifying the communications industry' 59 and enforcing other public policies, such as the elimination
of employment discrimination. 60 If inquiries into such matters raise free speech
questions, like Professor Kalven I am prepared to live with them as necessary evils
to be tolerated when shown to be essential to the allocation decision.'
Outright
prohibitions and such things as the fairness doctrine are, however, indefensible.
The various arguments for extending those controls on content to broadcasting,
while at the same time leaving newspapers entirely free, do not withstand scrutiny.
This ground has been covered before. But most of those who come this far insist
' Accord, Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing
en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the result) (allowing that choosing between competing applicants
for a broadcast license on the basis of such content neutral standards as financial stability, experience,
and diversification effect "is analogous to choosing a relief pitcher on the basis of his criminal record
and off-season earnings"). Of course, technical matters must play a role. E.g., United Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (approving the Commission's refusal to renew a license in light
of the applicant's "long history of persistent violations" of the rules governing technical operation).
'OSee, e.g., Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1974), reconsidered, 53 F.C.C.2d 589
(1975), afl'd in part, National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
modified, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
'o E.g., In re Nondiscrimination in Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60
F.C.C.2d 226 (1976), afl'd, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 560 F.2d
529 (2d Cir. 1977); Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975) (refusing to renew
eight educational stations because of pervasive race discrimination in employment and programming
practices). See UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: WOMEN AND
MINORITIES IN TELEVISION (1977).

" Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 37. Of course, I do not propose that the potential for
abuse does not exist. Anyone who peruses the Commission's renewal decisions is aware that unpopular
speakers and messages may be forced off the air under the guise of regulation in the public interest. The
leading cases are familiar. E.g., Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 914 (1973) (the drug-related lyric case); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the Carl McIntire case); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) (the Brinkley case). Nor do I mean to disregard the problems inherent in the cases on
change of format, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir.
1973), or the very real threats to freedom posed by such things as the Commission's "ascertainment"
requirements. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants Primer, 57 F.C.C.2d 418
(1976) (dealing with renewal applicants); Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971) (pertaining to original applicants). See Bamford v. FCC, 535 F.2d
78 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (approving refusal of a license because the applicant had not consulted with the
poor). It is obvious that there is in such schemes the potential for the most egregious, though subtle,
censorship. I insist, accordingly, that the Commission exercise judgment with the greatest sensitivity.

See Memorandum from the Subcommittee on Radio Regulation to the Communications Media Committee
of the American Civil Liberties Union (January 3, 1979) (urging retention of the ACLU policy supporting
ascertainment requirements) (on file with the Kansas Law Review). Of course, the introduction of
meaningful access would reduce substantially the need to examine the content of offerings and a licensee's
effort to address local concerns. See Canby, supra note 88 (contending that ascertainment is only a
backdoor means of access for local groups in any event).
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in the name of equality that broadcast regulation must cease.16 2 I take a different
view. Much of the content regulation in present law must go, but I would replace
it with an access doctrine grounded in the first amendment and applicable to newspapers and broadcasters alike.
Q: I daresay I can accept everything you have said and still defend different
treatment for broadcasting. A broadcast station can send only one signal at a time.
At any given moment, viewers are offered only that single message. Advertisers
who underwrite such messages see their interest in reaching the largest possible
audience. The result, I think you will agree, is a built-in economic incentive to
groom every moment of the broadcast day to a loosely defined majority of viewers.
Programming that appeals to minorities is less profitable and, for that reason alone,
is unlikely to be afforded significant time, particularly during peak viewing hours. 3
In order to counter the pressure from commercial interests and make a place for
the treatment of such matters, the fairness doctrine, or perhaps your access plan,
may be necessary. Turning to the print media, however, an entirely different case
is presented. In a single edition, a newspaper can include a great number of diverse
reports, features, editorials, columns, and commercial advertisements. There is
room even for cartoons and an occasional crossword puzzle. Thus, all at once, a
newspaper offers the public a range of materials to peruse, and there is less need
for governmentally imposed access. Indeed, newspapers have an incentive to make
their issues as diverse as possible, perhaps to tempt some readers to purchase a full
1 64
edition just to read Doonesbury
A: I can only suggest that you put your case to Professor Barron and others
who value the public's interest in hearing more than the individual's interest in
speaking.'
I come at the problem the other way. You will have a hard time persuading me that it is enough if the editors of a newspaper cover diverse topics and
present a variety of views. For my part, the first amendment demands that those
who genuinely hold those views have an opportunity to speak for themselves. Speech
is simply not free when it must be strained through the lips and pens of others.
Q: The terrain in this strange country is treacherous. Do you draw no distinctions? It is one thing to propose access to the New York Times but quite
another to demand that a limited-circulation Sierra Club bulletin must be open to
the views of strip miners.
A: Your hypothetical is a common one. It is troubling, of course, but it seems
to me there is an answer-which lies in an investigation of the reasons why the
...
E.g., NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCASTING AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1947); Emerson,
Colonial Intentions, supra note 74, at 752; Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast] Press," 55 TEX. L. REV. 39
(1976). Professor Bollinger is an exception. While he rejects, as I do, the standard justifications for
distinguishing broadcasting from the print media, he nonetheless justifies treating the two differently on
alternative grounds. In his view, access regulation is both a needed response to the peril of concentrated
control and a dangerous departure from traditional free speech doctrine. In order to have its benefits
while avoiding its dangers, he would establish a system of "partial regulation," which permits access
regulation but restricts it to only part of the mass media. The decision whether to impose it upon
broadcasters or newspapers, or for that matter CATV, should be left to the Congress. Bollinger, Freedom
of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1977).
',See note 97 supra.
'
See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV, L. REV. 701, 714 (1964).
' See notes 81-88 and accompanying text supra.

1979]

CONFESSIONS OF A HORIZONTALIST

Sierra Club, the ACLU, or the KKK are relegated to limited-circulation tabloids
in the first place. It is because they have no ready access to more meaningful forums,
like the Times.
Q: The fact remains that such publications do exist and, if you are to be realistic,
you must deal with them. It strikes me that the introduction of any view different
from that of the editors will take the edge off the editor's speech. Indeed, in a small
publication you may be faced with the very sort of mixture that disturbs you so
much in fairness doctrine cases.166 I should have thought that everyone's speech
would be more effective if small publications were permitted to take principled
stands, unclouded by competing views tacked on by those who disagree. Surely
many small voices coming at us independently can be more meaningful than the
same voices tied together in a single, incongruous collage.
A: I quite agree, and I certainly do not wish to be understood as proposing
anything of the kind. I do condemn the fairness doctrine approach, which confuses
conflicting views in what amounts to the same message. Small publications are
troubling. I have conceded that much. They are troubling because my horizontalist
theory is groomed to the vexing problems arising from the concentration of control
of mass communications in our day. Your question points up the difficulty of applying it to a system of numerous independent pamphleteers-the sort of system
we had when Tom Paine was alive but, for good or ill, we have no more. I want
small publications to be independent, free to express what opinions they will without regard for the positions taken by others. Perhaps a line can be drawn. Perhaps
small publications, identified by their purpose and range of circulation, can be
exempted from access responsibilities without jeopardizing logical consistency.17
I am at a loss to decide that without some concrete cases to inform my judgment.
The only statement I can make with confidence is that, at all events, the Court
will judge the time and space to be devoted to others' views. It would make no
sense to demand so much room for access that editors' messages are lost among
those of their competitors.
Q: You would not make common carriers of all the mass media?
A: Not necessarily. I do not see that locating a right of access to the media in
the first amendment logically must lead to limiting the speech of all comers to what
a referee allows. 6 s To be specific, I do not contend that every inch of the New
York Times must be open for use by anyone, with the editors of the Times restricted to the space they can command as individuals competing for space with
the world. I merely propose that some substantial space in the Times, and time in
the broadcast day, must be made available for the speech of those who do not conSee text at notes 106-08 supra.
" For example, the Commission's cross-ownership rules apply only to "daily newspapers." Limited
circulation print media published fewer than four times per week or in a language other than English
are excepted. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 n.10 (1978). See ASPEN NOTEBOOK, supra note 153, at 132 (comments
of Professor Pool) (distinguishing between oligopolistic and competitive newspapers).
" Contra, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139-40 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
'
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trol the newspaper or the broadcast station. Just how much space and time must
be open can, in my judgment, be determined by the Court.'6 9
Q: You are inconsistent. You insist that the focus of the first amendment is
horizontal and that the key in any case is to draw rational, content-neutral lines.
But then you concede that some speakers are to have special privileges. The holders
of broadcast licenses and city desk chairs may command more than their fair share
of time and space, presumably to express their own views at the expense of
other messages.
A: I am only being practical. Someone must maintain the mass media or we
will have no meaningful expression at all. I am content to rely on private editors
170
rather than public bureaucracy for the chore.

Q: I am not finished. Aside from the problem of dividing time in the broadcast day and space in a newspaper between editors and outsiders, you must devise
some criteria for choice among those competing for the room allotted to the latter.
The demand exceeds the supply.
A: The problem is the familiar one of allocating scarce resources--on a different
level.1' If time or space is sold to the highest bidder, meaningful speech will be
limited to those who can pay for it-the antithesis of horizontalism. A lottery leaves
it all to chance. A first come, first served system avoids the corruption of economics
but introduces new worries. It takes no account of repetitive requests by the same
groups to state their views on the same issues, or the special need of some messages
to be heard immediately, as, for example, when on the night before an election the
leading candidate is found to be a horse thief.'72 Here again, I must tell you that
I do not have a really good answer for your question. I concede that criteria of
selection must be identified, but I would leave it to the Court to take up the burden
after appraising the competition that in fact develops under an access doctrine, not
what we may guess will occur. 171 I will say, however, that you are quite wrong if
" I am aware that the American Civil Liberties Union advocates that CATV systems be treated for the
most part as common carriers, with system owners limited to the use of one channel for their own cablecasting. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975). A good case can
be made for separating the program creation function in mass communications from the program transmission function. E.g., Verrill, CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or Common Carrier?, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 586 (1969). Nothing I have said is inconsistent with such a course. The ACLU merely
goes a step further and decides how much space (or, rather, how many channels) a cable operator should
retain for its own use.
"'See Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that even public newspaper editors must be permitted to edit), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
982 (1977). Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105-14
(1973) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (emphasizing the American tradition of "private" control of the press).
"See text at notes 156-57 supra.
..See Note, 85 HARv. L. REv. 689, 697 (1972). I do not mean by this last comment to undercut
Justice Black's opinion in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). It is one thing to ban election day
editorials because they may be too effective, and quite another to recognize the need of some messages
for immediate expression-thus enhancing their effectiveness. While any focus upon the content of
speech is troublesome, I cannot say that when content is considered in an effort to promote effective expression it is unacceptable. Just as facially neutral blanket prohibitions can discriminate against messages
that have no alternative medium, criteria of selection that blindly consider all messages alike can discriminate against those likely to become stale as they wait their turn.
17I will concede that if the media receive requests approaching the letters to the editor filed with
the New York Times, severe administrative problems will arise. See Daniel, supra note 138, at 785
(reporting that in 1969 the Times received enough such letters to fill 135 complete weekday issues). On
the other hand, most broadcast stations and newspapers are nothing like the Times, Their audiences are
much more limited, their present offerings much less valuable. A glance at the inside pages of the average
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you think I would deny access to a speaker on the ground that someone else has
already made the same point. Although such speech by hypothesis adds nothing
to the public's information, it surely does serve first amendment values even as
cumulative expression. 74
Q: Your theory seems to falter a bit in practical application. How do you
respond to the bad experience we have had with access to date-the Commission's
abortive attempt to require cable companies to set aside at least four channels for
the free use of individuals and community groups ?175 If I am not mistaken, most
viewers prefer entertainment formats and tune access channels out. They are left
to club notes, church services, and an occasional school play.
A: The record is not good. Perhaps access channels will prove to be modern
day cornfields, where anyone is free to speak to those willing to hike some distance
from the beaten path to listen. If viewers insist upon limiting their selection to a
few entertainment channels, then unlimited access to others will do nothing to
enhance the effectiveness of expression. If my primary interest were to ensure that
all views are heard, I would be most upset at the prospect. However, inasmuch as
my chief concern is rather that all speakers have a meaningful opportunity to speak,
I am less disturbed. In the short run, the opportunity to use an access CATV
channel may seem inadequate. But I believe that in the long run it will make all the
difference. You see, cable falls roughly between broadcasting and the print media.
Like broadcasting, cable brings picture messages into the home with the flick of a
dial. Yet, like newspapers, it can offer a good deal of variety simultaneously. While
under the present regulatory regime and economic conditions broadcast stations
are generally limited to the stock fare of the three networks, cable companies can
offer scores of channels with all manner of programming. If that extraordinary
capacity for diversity is exploited and viewers still decline cable's many offerings in
favor of a few entertainment channels, then nothing more need be said or done.
The horse will have refused to drink. There will be little call to impose access
upon entertainment channels. 17 6 The great advantage of access theory is that it
does not water down or detract from existing programming but only pits spirited
expression against opposing views in a content-neutral fashion. 177 But let me be
daily reveals ample room for access. Powe, supra note 162, at 44 (pointing out that, after a fair amount
of advertising, most newspapers contain only "the sports pages with their rehash of the last game and
promotion of the next one, the gossip columnists, the horoscopes, and the comic strips"). Editors may
insist that every inch devoted to access must be stolen from their own messages, but it just is not so. In
most instances access would merely reduce the filler copy editors now offer when they have nothing
else to say.
...
See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
1- 47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1978), vacated, FCC v. Midwest Video .... U.S ...... 99 S. Ct. 1435 (1979).
..Cf. Jorgenson, Schwartz & Woods, Programming Diversity in Proposals for New Broadcast
Licenses, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 769 (1964) (questioning the Commission's insistence upon "balanced"
programming from each station when contrasting views may in fact be available to an audience that takes
advantage of the offerings of all stations in the market). I am aware that some have condemned my
view as naive. Most notably, Professor Canby has argued that those who seek access to the mass media
do so not merely to offer their opinions to those willing to listen but to persuade as many viewers as
can be reached. Access cable channels, then, are inadequate. Most viewers are addicted to network
programming, and if they are to be reached and persuaded access to the popular entertainment channels
is necessary. Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 723 (1972). As much as I understand and appreciate Canby's insight, I must reject it
in favor of my own "idealism."
'I
am thus in flat-footed disagreement with Professor Barrow, who contends that diversification may
increase the need for something like the fairness doctrine to ensure that fragmented audiences do not
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clear. There is reason for hope. When cable technology makes possible the presentation of great diversity at all times, I believe Americans will respond with
alacrity, and the numbing banality of standard entertainment programming will
lose its iron grip on the public. When everyone with ideas has access to a channel,
when every turn of the dial permits another voice to be raised, then cable will be

not a cornfield but a twentieth century soap box.17s On that day the first amendment will mean something in the United States. I have just enough faith in the
public to think that most speakers will have an audience. 179
Q: Perhaps I should ask a more fundamental question. In traditional analysis,
the first question in any constitutional case is whether responsibility for the conduct
under attack can fairly be ascribed to the state. If you were to rest your access
doctrine upon a legislative enactment or even an administrative rule or regulation,
the requisite governmental responsibility would be apparent. But I understand you
to rely upon the first amendment of its own force, and for that you must locate
governmental action in the policies of broadcasters and newspapers. That will be
difficult. A plurality of the Justices said in the CBS case that broadcasters do not
act for the state,' 80 and certainly Tornillo can be cited for the proposition that newshabitually tune in only one side of vital issues and make decisions without benefit of a "balanced"
presentation. Responding to the argument that viewers will recognize bias and turn periodically to
conflicting opinion, he declares that "the public cannot evaluate whether sophisticated programming is
fair and decide whether to turn the dial unless the listeners hear both sides." Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L.
REV. 447, 491-92 (1968). That sort of paternalism has no place in the system of freedom of expression
we have or ought to have. Here again the emphasis on the correlative interests of viewers distorts the
meaning of free speech. Barrow's first amendment guarantees "balanced" programming whether viewers
want it or not. Access CATV channels, on the other hand, provide an opportunity for effective speech
by multiple tongues to be embraced or disregarded at the discretion of listeners. This is what free speech
means. I trust Americans to examine critically what is offered to them from a soap box or television
screen and to test the validity of what they are told against arguments found on alternative channels.
To be sure, in this country we have been hoodwinked from time to time by flim-flam artists selling
everything from vacuum sweepers to fascism. But we have survived them all. If in the future we are
put to stiffer tests by more "sophisticated programming," I prefer to trust individual perspicacity, rather
than government-imposed "balance," to distill truth from propaganda. See Jaffe, supra note 91, at 769
(suggesting that even the most persuasive broadcasting will not convince a five-star general that war is
wicked); Lyle & Hoffman, Children's Use of Television and Other Media, in IV U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 129, 177 (1972) (reporting that a majority of
sixth graders tested stated that commercials "never tell the truth" or at best do so only "some of the time").
178I take the term, and to some lesser extent the idea, from Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Century
Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REV. 574 (1971). See R.
KLETTER, CABLE TELEVISION: MAKING PUBLIC ACCESS EFFECTIVE (1973)
(surveying the success stories
under the Commission's access rules).
'"If the ruling in the Home Box Office case, discussed in note 152 supra, stands up, and CATV is
exempted from many of the responsibilities imposed upon broadcasting, it is quite possible that in a
short time the American public may be served by a nationwide wire-TV system that in many respects
will be superior to over-the-air commercial broadcasting. Of course, the establishment of such a system
will depend upon an array of economic factors too complex for consideration here. See Gordon, The
Economics of Cable Television, in CABLE TELEVISION-TAPPING THE POTENTIAL (R. COLL & M. BOTEIN
ed. 1972); NOLL, PECK & MCGOWAN, supra note 97, at 197 (suggesting that a complete shift to cable
would be infeasible) (surveying the possibilities); Barnett & Greenberg, Regulating CATV Systems: An
Analysis of FCC Policy and an Alternative, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 562 (1969) (urging toleration
of competition); Barrow, The New CATV Rules: Proceed on Delayed Yellow, 25 VAND. L. REV. 681
(1972) (appraising the Commission's attitude toward its development as an alternative to broadcasting);
Greenberg, Wire Television and the FCC's Second Report and Order on CATV Systems, 10 J. LAW &
EcON. 181 (1967) (emphasizing the advantages of cable); Robinson, Essay, supra note 157 (characterizing
the Commission's work as a "classic example of a watchdog out of control"). See generally D. LE Duc,
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC (1973).
'Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.); id. at 148 (Douglas, J., concurring). In separate concurring opinions, justices White,
Powell, and Blackmun took the position that, assuming arguendo that the Constitution could be brought

1979]

CONFESSIONS OF A HORIZONTALIST

papers are so far from the actions of government that they are indeed protected
from it.''

A: To my mind, the search for state action in the wooden sense of discrete
government involvement with the defendant in a lawsuit is at best misleading and
at worst naive.1s 2 For too long the threshold state action analysis has been a convenient escape from important constitutional analysis. But let me be clear. I do
not propose that the first amendment applies to broadcasters because they use a
public resource, serve a public function, or hold a public trust.'
Nor do I think
that the Commission's extensive regulatory controls amount to sufficient contacts
between government and broadcasters to establish a "symbiotic relationship" warranting constitutional review.'8 4 I reject even the more fashionable argument that
the fairness doctrine serves as a nexus between the Commission and broadcasters'
access policies,' and I certainly do not agree that the first amendment's application
turns on a conclusion that broadcasters are government. 8
Q: What ground have you left uncovered?
A: The state action requirement in constitutional law can be approached from
different perspectives. On the one hand, the question can be understood as whether
the conduct of some apparently private entity is sufficiently connected with government to justify ascribing responsibility for its actions to government and subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny. That is the way most of the familiar state
action cases have come at it. 87 On the other hand, the same cases can be understood from the perspective of government officials who are alleged to have ties to
the private action under challenge, and the question may be reframed as whether
the maintenance of such ties violates the Constitution.
Q: Can you give me an example?
A: Take the Mississippi Gay Alliance case S-one the Supreme Court decided
not to decide. Relying on the line of cases holding that state-operated newspapers
into play in an attack on broadcasters' policies, the first amendment does not mandate access. Accordingly, the government action issue did not need to be decided. Id. at 146-48. Only Justices Brennan
and Marshall would have employed a first amendment analysis. Id. at 170.
' Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
"See Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
...
Compare Johnson & Westen, supra note 178, at 587-91 (relying on these arguments to find government action) with Jaffe, supra note 91, at 782-84 (rejecting them).
'"See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961). I recognize, however, that the Chief Justice's attempt in CBS to distinguish Burton
and, certainly, Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), is less than satisfying. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 179-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"sCompare Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) with Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 115 (1973) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Here again,
Justice Brennan would have found a sufficient nexus. Id. at 177. See Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977) (suggesting that the fairness doctrine "nexus" puts the strongest
case for "governmental action").
" Compare Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 138-40 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (insisting that a finding of government action would have made common
carriers of licensees) with id. at 181 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding Stewart's view to reflect
"a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the governmental involvement in these cases").
187 See, e.g., cases cited in note 184 supra.
' Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S.
982 (1977).
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are public forums and cannot discriminate on the basis of speech content,' the
Alliance sued the editor of The Reflector, a student newspaper at Mississippi State
University, for refusing to accept for publication advertisements and announcements
pertaining to gays. Finding "not the slightest whisper that the University authorities had anything to do with the rejection of this material,"'190 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held for the defendant.'' The first amendment, said
19 2
Judge Coleman for the majority, "interdicts judicial interference" in such a case.
On my analysis the opposite is true. Not only does the first amendment permit the
courts to intervene, it mandates intervention to ensure that minority views are not
stifled by the intolerance of editors. If I had been counsel to the Alliance, I would
have sued the university officials rather than the student editor. I would have found
constitutional fault not in the student's insensitive action but in the university policy
permitting content discrimination by the newspaper.
Q: Surely you cannot wish the state action problem away simply by changing
defendants. The court still must appraise the connection between the officials and
the newspaper-indeed, between the officials and the particular editorial decision
under attack.'
A: To be sure. Since, however, state authorities are named as defendants for
performance of their official duties, the issue is no longer whether there is state
action to bring the Constitution into play but whether the admittedly official policy
violates the first amendment.'
If it does not, then the Alliance loses on the merits
of its first amendment claim. If it does, then the university officials must permit
reasonable access to the newspaper, under standards fixed by the court.
Q: Is there no other possibility? It seems to me that what you are really talking
about is remedy. In any case in which a court finds state action in violation of the
Constitution, the offending party has a choice. The practice found to be invalid
can be altered to conform to the Constitution, or all ties to the state can be severed.
For example, the Eagle Coffee Shoppe in the Burton case '95 was not forced to
desegregate. It might rather have bought up its lease and moved into a private
building across the street. To mention a case in which government officials are sued
directly, the IRS Commissioner may choose between coercing a tax-exempt organization into integration or simply withdrawing the exemption.9 6 Why, then,
"E.g., Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D.
Wis. 1969).
...
536 F.2d at 1075.

...
Judge Goldberg dissented in an opinion that grappled at some length with the troubling constitutional
values at stake. While his opinion is instructive on a number of issues, its examination of the threshold
state action question is at best inadequate. Insisting that it was unnecessary to find affirmative involvement of university officials in the decision under attack, Judge Goldberg rested his finding of state action
primarily on public funding of The Reflector. Id. at 1084-85.
" Id. at 1075.
...
Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that state regulation of a
utility is insufficient state action). But see Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978)
(limiting the "nexus" requirement from Jackson to cases involving private defendants).
...
See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 581 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring) (recognizing
that in suits against public officials arising out of transactions they enter in behalf of government "there
is very plainly state action of some sort" and the real question is whether that state action violates the
Constitution).
" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
"See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623,
636 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Green v. Connally, 330
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cannot Mississippi State officials respond to a successful lawsuit by withdrawing
official support from The Reflector?
A: Under a simplistic "equal access" approach to the public forum problem,
refusing to support the newspaper would be a valid response. I have already told
you, however, that blanket rules against speech are not always content-neutral. 97
I will concede that there are places where speech is anomalous and can be barred,
but a student newspaper is clearly a public forum that must remain open.
Q: Even if you posit that by suing state officials the Alliance can avoid the
state action problem, you must admit that it will be difficult to show that the
authorities are responsible for a student editor's decision. I recall that Judge Coleman
found "not the slightest whisper" that they had anything to do with it. At most,
the Alliance must contend that the authorities' inaction violates the first amendment.
If that argument succeeds, it will make novel constitutional doctrine." 8
A: I quite agree. But, then, I have already acknowledged that the affirmative
dimension to the first amendment I propose is not supported in the cases.
Q: How you will reach broadcasters and ordinary newspapers?
A: The Communications Commission can be sued for licensing broadcasters
that refuse access to outsiders. That was not done in CBS. In those consolidated
cases the Commission was a nominal defendant only because one of its rulings was
on appeal.1 99 None of the parties supposed that the Commission was the primary
respondent and that the outcome of the lawsuit might be the revocation of offending
broadcasters' licenses.
Q: Newspapers are different, are they not?
A: Yes. But the difference should not be exaggerated. While there is no
Federal Paper Commission to offer an easy target for suit, I venture to say that in
many cases the Postal Service will do as well. It is common knowledge that some
newspapers and most magazines depend upon special postal rates.' °° In a like
manner, local governments serve up legal notices that bring in critical revenues.2 '
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), afl'd per curiam sub nom. Goit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997

(1971).
'x See text at notes 18-20 supra.

"°See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
389 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see 436 U.S. at 168-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise
of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966).

" The Commission was named as defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976).
'See Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 303-04 (1913). Ablard & Harrison, The Post
Office and Publishers' Pursestrings: A Study the Second-Class Mailing Permit, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
567 (1962). Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (holding that low postal rates could
not be denied to Esquire); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921) (upholding a revocation of low rates for future issues of the Milwaukee Leader
on the basis of findings as to past issues). Indeed, when the Postal Reorganization Act raised secondclass rates in 1970, Look went summarily out of business, 0. FRAENKEL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY 48 (1973), and other, more limited circulation publications began to feel a
financial pinch they had not experienced before. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 159 n.10 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (mentioning The National Review,
The Nation, and The New Republic). See Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States
Postal Serv., 569 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reviewing the congressional objective to cease making first
class mail pay part of the costs of other classes).
'See Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. Definance County 1919).
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Various other subsidies come to mind. The Newspaper Preservation Act 20 2 exempts newspapers from the antitrust laws, and now Mr. Udall's proposed Independent Local Newspaper Act2 3 promises to retard the growth of chains by providing estate tax relief for small independents. Any of these ties between government
and the print media may serve as suitable vehicles for court action.2 °4
Q: I am not so sure. I can conceive of a lawsuit against the Postal Service, contending that reduced rates for discriminating newspapers and magazines are unconstitutional, but it seems to me that such a suit would present the access argument
in at best a convoluted way. Even if I give you that one, I can find no defendant
at all in a case in which, for example, the allegedly invalid governmental tie is an
exemption from the antitrust laws.
A: I understand and appreciate your discomfort on both counts. But, again,
you must not misread what I propose. In the hypothetical suit against the Postal
Service, treatment of the rate structure is secondary. It is a mere vehicle for presenting the access question to the Court. Once a proper plaintiff and official defendant are identified and the "state action" problem is resolved, the Court can
turn to the real matters in issue-whether the newspaper or magazine concerned
is a forum that must be open to those who do not control the presses and, if so,
how much space must be made available to outsiders. The constitutional fault lies
not so much in government's comparatively insignificant postal subsidy, but in its
tolerance of content discrimination.
Q: That is to complain about government's inaction again.
A: Precisely. Now, on your second point, let me say that there surely will be
cases in which no ready governmental defendant can be found. As you suggest,
the Newspaper Preservation Act may well work to the advantage of a newspaper,
but one can hardly sue the Congress in order to get the matter before the Court.
The same problem arises regarding major daily newspapers like the Times. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to identify government subsidies when each issue is
delivered by hand. I suppose the Times' delivery trucks use the public streets, but a
lawsuit against the street commissioner would be less than satisfying.20 5
Q: You concede the point, then?
A: No, I make another one. A distinction must be drawn between the substantive principle of law I propose and possible procedural means for bringing it
before the Court for consideration. The judicial power in this country is restricted
to cases or controversies, 20 and accordingly, the Court can treat constitutional issues
only in the context of a lawsuit between at least two identifiable parties. Often
o 15 U.S.C. § 1801-1804 (1976).

See 0. FRAENKEL, supra note 200, at 34-37.
SH.R. 2770, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Cl. Loevinger, supra note 139, at 296 (pointing out that these forms of governmental largesse
"might serve as a jurisdictional basis for asserting control if the legislative and judicial branches should
ever concur in seeking to do so").
'But see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough Council of Swarthmore, 381 F. Supp. 228 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (invalidating as applied an ordinance construed to prohibit newspaper vending boxes on
public sidewalks and in so doing implying that city government can, does, and indeed must subsidize
the distribution of newspapers on the public streets).
2
o U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2.
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such a lawsuit can be constructed, and I have just given some examples. Yet even
when a proper defendant cannot be identified, the same principle can be advanced.
A proposition is not robbed of its force as law simply because it cannot be hammered
into the framework and language of a lawsuit. The inability of our judicial mano more than institutional shortcomings, not
chinery to reach a proposition0 reflects
7
the validity of the proposition.1
Q: I may be getting a glimmer. If I understand correctly, you mean to leave
aside the practical problem of putting the question to the Court and, instead, simply
decree that the first amendment establishes a right of access to the mass media. It is
not that some identifiable government agency violates the first amendment by underwriting content discrimination or even that the agency has a constitutional duty to
coerce the media into content-neutral policies. Your point is that the first amendment itself creates the right of access, and the Court, as an arm of government, is
charged with the responsibility of describing that right on the facts of each case.
A: I could not have put it better.
Q: You move too far too fast. You blame all the world's ills on government,
which under your theory must bear responsibility not only for what it does but
what it does not do. Yet the American constitutional scheme rests upon the fundamental principle of individual responsibility. Historically, government in this country has in most respects kept out of the media field-reflecting our collective fear
that governmental support for the media would bring regulation and regulation
would in turn bring censorship.20 8 That, after all, is why the larger part of American television has a commercial base. I have always assumed that we put up with
toothpaste commercials in order to be free of government controls. You suggest
that it is all for naught, that government bears responsibility for whatever appears
on the screen.
A: In a real sense, that is my view. I reject the notion that government is
responsible only for identifiable actions in the traditional sense. In this age government is all-pervasive. What it does is of vital importance; what it does not do can
be even more critical. For what government does not prohibit, it permits; and what
it permits, it directs. There is no middle ground. At present, government is pelting
the American public with a finely tuned commercial message-the message of conservatism, orthodox religion, and consumer sales. I, for one, have had enough of it.
Q: Your elitism is showing. At least if we confine our discussion to commercial
television, the standard fare is notoriously bland and tasteless. 2°9 On the other hand,
'Thus it hardly follows from the judicial unenforceability of the guaranty clause, Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), that the Congress has no responsibility to maintain a republican form of
government in the states.
Thus, recent discussions of a special role for the press in the structure of American government
emphasize that governmental assistance may be just as damaging to an independent fourth estate as
special burdens. E.g., Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. Rav. 731 (1977). See
Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of
Speech?, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HAsrINGs L.J. 631 (1975); Van
Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press o1 Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HAsTINGs L.J. 761 (1977).
Similar concerns emerge from the establishment clause cases. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
264 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
John Macy begins his book on the potential for public broadcasting with a reference known to anyone familiar with the literature on mass communications.
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that sort of pap is apparently what most Americans want. We avoid leftist
harangues, threats to traditional values, and the like. At the end of the day when
work is through, we want only to relax in front of The Waltons 1 ° Who are you
to insist upon something more cerebral?
A: Nonsense. I suspect relatively few people really enjoy the soporific fare of
commercial television. Your argument that anyone does proceeds from an inaccurate premise-that broadcasters and advertisers structure their programming to
appeal to people and thus to gain a larger audience for commercial messages. It just
is not so. No one is much interested in appealing to audience desires. Individual
tastes vary too much for that. Instead, an attempt is made to reduce programming
to the lowest common denominator to avoid offending any more viewers than
necessary. 2" It is assumed that so long as programming is tolerable viewers will
continue to watch it whether they really enjoy it or not. Thus "family programming"
is programming for children that adults can stand.212
Q: Still, that is what sells cars and toothpaste.
A: To be sure. So long as Americans tolerate the ceaseless monotony of it,
the standard fare will sell anything the hucksters have to offer.
Q: Do you mean to challenge the commercial base of television in this country?
When Newton Minow delivered his first address as chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission . . . in early 1961, he coined a description of the current television offerings that still
aptly applies to the bulk of programming today, a dozen years later. "The vast wasteland" he
painted . . . that day has continued to attract ever larger American audiences . . . . [T]he average
family spends the equivalent of twelve full weeks out of the years in front of that one-eyed
monster. The only activity, in fact, that occupies more time in the home is sleeping-although
some would observe that the two pastimes are synonymous.
J. MACY, To IRIOATE A WASTELAND 1 (1974).
210LoSciuto, supra note 149, at 59 (reporting that most adults look to television viewing for relaxation rather than edification or self-improvement). See B. BAGDIKIAN, THE EFFETE CONSPIRACY 7 (1972)
(quoting H. L. Mencken, "No one ever went broke underestimating the taste of the American public").
' See note 97 supra. I cannot resist the analogy to canned soup. It is bland, of course, because the
introduction of seasoning would inevitably make it unpalatable to some customers. The trick is to malke
it bland, but just tasty enough to satisfy the very minimum demands of the largest possible market.
The result is programming that varies little from station to station and network to network as all suppliers compete for the largest possible number of viewers. Dirlam & Kahn, The Merits of Reserving the
Cost-Savings from Domestic Communications Satellites for Support of Educational Television, 77 YALE
L.J. 494, 515-17 (1968). Indeed, when it appears to advertisers that their viewers are not necessarily
buyers, they may pressure broadcasters to fashion programming designed to reach "the more gullible
purchasers of the advertised product." Id. at 518. See W. ScHRAMm, RESPONSIBILITY SN MASS COMMUNicATIoN 270 (1957) (contending that broadcasters often cannot forecast what will appeal to viewers).
Cf. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J. LAW & EcoN. 71 (1964).
'The experience with the so-called family viewing hour makes the point. In response to pressure
from the Commission to eliminate sex and violence from programming during hours when children are
viewing, the National Association of Broadcasters adopted an amendment to its Television Code prohibiting "programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family" between the hours of 7:00 and
9:00 p.m. NAB TELEVISION CODE 2-3 (18th ed. 1975). See Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation
Under the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1527 (1975). The result was a shot in the arm for
nature programming, game shows, and reruns of Hee Haw. Meanwhile, All in the Family, one of the
few regular programs with significant intellectual content, was forced out of its coveted 8:00 p.m. slot.
Note, The Family Viewing Hour: An Assault on the First Amendment?, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 935,
937 (1977). See Pierce, The Bunkers, the Critics, and the News, in TELEWSION AS A CULTURAL FORCE
59 (R. Adler & D. Cater eds. 1976) (examining All in the Family). Although a federal district court
enjoined the Commission from forcing the policy upon the networks, Writers Guild of America v. FCC,
423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Calif. 1976), it survives today by "private" agreement. Other, "self-regulating"
bodies have instituted similar controls. E.g., Note, Regulation of Comic Books, 68 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1955) (examining the scheme used by the Comics Magazine Association of America); Note, Private
Censorship of Movies, 22 STAN. L. REV. 618 (1970) (reviewing the Code followed by the Motion Picture
Ass'n of America).
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A: No. Paid commercial messages during the hours of the day when the
broadcaster has control of the facility in order to make the profits may be necessary
to continued operation. The rest of the time, however, commercials213 should compete on an equal basis with all other messages offered by outsiders.
Q: What if that is not enough? What if broadcast stations cannot survive by
selling advertising time only part of the day? Would you introduce direct governmental subsidies to keep them above water?
A: Accepting your question as stated, my answer must be yes. But I seriously
doubt that establishing a right of access during part of the broadcast day would
make broadcast stations unprofitable.214 At all events, I see little significance in the
manner of governmental involvement. I do not understand why anyone would
object to a direct subsidy and prefer in its place a governmental decision to bombard
the public with General Motors advertisements.
Q: You talk as though government bureaucrats perched somewhere in Washington are even now conspiring about what Americans will see and hear tomorrow.
That is not the case. Even if I concede that those decisions are being made in relatively few corporate board rooms, that still is far better than governmental control.215
A: I can only remind you that I do not propose that some government agency
should assume the task of scheduling television programming. I shudder at the
thought. My point is that government so pervades the communications media that
responsibility for what is expressed on the screen or, for that matter, on the printed
page can be ascribed to official policy. I mean not only the governmental regulation
and subsidization of the media I have mentioned but government's multifaceted
command of the economics of mass communications. This is only to recognize
that what government does, or does not do, in the fields of property and corporate
law, and certainly economic policy, is very clearly responsible for the reins of the
mass media being where they are-in the hands of relatively few corporations
whose primary concern is in profitmaking through commercial advertising by other
corporations. 21" That, to my mind, is sufficient governmental involvement to warrant invoking the first amendment to protect the views of outsiders, whose voices
may otherwise be drowned out by those who control the media at the sufferance

of government. I propose not more governmental control but less. I propose that
television, radio, cable, and the print media be open for use by all manner of people
' Cf. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(suggesting that broadcasters may legitimately "place an outside limit on the total amount of editorial
advertising they will sell").
'See R. BUNcE, TELEVISION IN THE CORPORATE INTEREST 96-103 (1976) (pointing out that the
Commission assists licensees in keeping "the specifics of broadcast profiteering" confidential but that the
data that are available indicate astonishing profit margins); NOLL, PECK & McGOWAN, supra note 97, at
16 (reporting that television stations show a rate of return more than twice as high as other corporations).
"See, e.g., Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 561 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(reviewing allegations that the CPB, the Public Broadcasting Service, and members of the Nixon White
House staff attempted to force controversial programs out of public broadcasting entirely). See also Top
of the Week, BROADCASrINo, Feb. 26, 1979, at 35 (summarizing documents on the Nixon White House
released by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration).
21 Top of the Week, BRoADCASrINo, Feb. 26, 1979, at 13-15 (emphasizing the Commission's complicity
in the maintenance of powerful communications empires). There is nothing new in this. The media have
been big business for a very long time. See H. ICKES, AMERICA'S HousE oF LoRws 35-37 (1939) (describing "pressure from advertisers").
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with views of their own. The only governmental control I envision comes from the
Court, which must oversee the division of space and time in an equitable fashion.
Q: At the very least, you ask a good bit of nine old men. Why is not the Commission a likely surrogate?
A: The Commission cannot serve this function because it lacks the constitutional
independence of the Supreme Court, which as the third branch of the national government can withstand the majoritarian pressures the proposal will surely elicit.
2 17
Then, too, the Commission's history does not instill confidence.
Q: Your willingness to disregard totally the threshold state action issue, except
to identify state responsibility in the underlying law that permits control of the
media to be concentrated, is simply astonishing. In our theory, the Constitution
serves essentially two functions. First, it establishes the structure of the national
government by, for example, fixing the power and authority of the three branches
and describing the relationship between the national government and the states.
Second, it erects safeguards, both substantive and procedural, to protect the individual from governmental excesses. In both cases the Constitution speaks primarily
to government. With few exceptions, it says nothing at all about the relations between private parties. Your framework blurs the distinction between the public
and private spheres, and in so doing challenges the very foundation of American
constitutionalism. Various questions come to mind. Up to now, we have assumed
that government has no constitutional rights, but only responsibilities or powers.
You place constitutional responsibilities upon entities I consider private. Would
you grant constitutional rights, for example the right of free speech, to entities that
I consider official?
A: You worry too much. I do not see that my proposal is really so radical.
On the matter of state action, it is not so different from the suggestions of several
others in the wake of the Shelley case.21 s Of course, the question there was the application of the equal protection clause to combat race discrimination, but the same
sort of analysis can be used in the first amendment context. Even the Burger Court
occasionally permits the state action issue to shade into a consideration of a first
amendment problem on the merits. 19 Coming to your specific question, my answer
may surprise you. I am not at all sure that government does not have first amendment rights after a fashion. There are cases on the books in which statements made
'" Consider, for example, the new cross-ownership rules. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636. At the
outset, the Commission proposed divestiture in all cases within five years, but after hundreds of parties
filed objections only a prospective ban was imposed. Existing co-located combinations were thus grandfathered in, with the dissatisfying explanation that the disruptive economic effects of divestiture had been
underestimated earlier. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 945-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) modified, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 182, at 209.
[W]henever, and however, a state gives legal consequences to transactions between private
persons there is "state action"-i.e ... the definition by a state of legal relations between private
persons is, for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a matter of "state action."
See also Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961); Note, State Action Reconsidered
in the Light of Shelley v. Kraemer, 48 COLuM. L. REV. 1241 (1948); Note, The Disintegration of a
Concept-State Action Under the 14th and 15th Amendments, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 402 (1948).
S' E.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)
(blurring the threshold question whether there
is sufficient state involvement in a privately owned shopping center to implicate the fourteenth amendment with the further question whether, assuming the application of the Constitution is granted, a policy restricting leafletting to sidewalks outside the mall is invalid).
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in an official capacity were given first amendment protection. 22 0 And it remains
to be seen what the Court will do when a trial judge attempts to gag the police or
a prosecutor in order to avoid pretrial publicity. The effect upon newspapers'
ability to get and report the news is apparent 2' I want to be clear. I am not sure
that what I have said about the application of the first amendment to the mass
media turns on any particular answer to these questions. I mention them only to
show that a simplistic dichotomy between government and private parties does
22
not always provide a satisfying answer to modern first amendment problemsY2

Circumstances have changed since 1791. This is the age of mass communications,
and control of the media is concentrated in the very few.
Q: I do not doubt that monopoly is your chief concern, but I find it curious
that in all you have said you have not suggested that the problem might be met
forthrightly with limits on the ownership of mass communications facilities.
A: I am frankly pessimistic on that score. Of course, in the broadcasting field
the Commission has long recognized that diversification is in the public interest."
Various policies in aid of competition and antitrust objectives provide ready examples. I think of the chain-broadcasting, syndication, prime time access, duopoly,
multiple-ownership, and cross-ownership rules. I find them altogether legitimate,
content-neutral regulations designed to open the media to more voices. Whether
the Court will agree remains to be seen.
m E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
'See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 838 (1971); Note,
The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974). Cf.
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)
(striking down a local rule and an ABA rule prohibiting comments by attorneys about pending litigation); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (vacating an order
restraining all participants in litigation from discussing the case).
'See Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 237, 244 (1978) (counseling
that an acceptable free speech theory cannot insist that government be an "ideological eunuch") [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Metatheory]. Here again the Mississippi Gay Alliance case provides an illustration. In
aid of his decision against the Alliance, Judge Coleman insisted that, since editorial responsibility rested
entirely with a student who had been elected by his classmates, the first amendment would have prohibited university officials from interferring with his decision even if they had wanted to become involved.
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Coudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982
(1977). For authority, he looked to Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1973), afl'd as mod.,
489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). To begin, that citation is hardly helpful. In Bazaar, officials
at the University of Mississippi attempted not to force student editors to accept material entitled to be
published but rather to prevent the publication of a magazine they found in poor taste. Bazaar, in my
view, was correctly decided. I see nothing in that case that conflicts with the position I would take in
Mississippi Gay Alliance. On the other hand, I anticipate the argument from some that if I once decide
that university officials are responsible for content discrimination by student editors of The Reflector,
when a case like Bazaar arises at Mississippi State University I will have difficulty permitting students
to assert the first amendment against their deans. Such a concern stems from a crabbed understanding
of "state action" that simply will not do service as the distinction between the public and the private
increasingly evaporates in the waning years of this century. Cf. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock,
536 F.2d at 1090 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (recognizing that his opinion seemed "anomalous" to the
extent it protected student editors from censorship but at the same time argued that they "may themselves be treated ... as agents of the state in their dealings with the public").
'See 47 C.F.R. SS 73.35, 73.240, 73.636. The Court said in United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334
(1958), that while the Commission does not enforce the antitrust laws, it may draw upon antitrust
policies in order to implement its "public interest, convenience and necessity" standard. See generally
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (reviewing the cases holding
that the Commission must consider diversification in the licensing process). Of course, newspapers are
subject to the antitrust laws directly. Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper
Industry, 82 HARV. L. REv. 319 (1968); Note, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61
YALE L.J. 948 (1952).
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Q: What is the basis of your pessimism?
A: In some cases, the cure may be worse than the disease. If, for example, the
three television networks or the wire services were to come under attack, their
marvelous capacity for bringing us reports on national and world events might be
threatened. In others, the offending parties may be beyond the Commission's reach.
The great conglomerates are even now eating up communications facilities at an
accelerated rate 24 Their existence illustrates a fundamental economic truth. Concentration of control, in communications or any other field, is merely a reflection
of the vexing maldistribution of wealth and power in this country. It is deeply
entrenched and will not be dislodged without a great deal more effort than the
Commission and the Court are likely to summon. To be sure, concentration has
led me to horizontalism, and, at least as a matter of logic, diversification might
drive me from it. The baseline point, however, is that the prospect of cataclysmic
change is remote. I am afraid we must resign ourselves to concentration for the
foreseeable future and take what steps we can to limit its power to skew our system
of freedom of expression.
Q: Are you resigned, then, to the prospect of a political process dominated by
the manipulation of great corporate wealth?
A: I thought you would come sooner or later to the First National Bank case.2z
The four opinions offered by the Justices provide a virtual laboratory for an examination of modern free speech issues. Particles of wisdom appear in all four,
but in none is the problem of first amendment focus identified and treated in any
satisfying way. 2 Indeed, I find these opinions ample evidence of the intellectual
price we continue to pay for the Court's analytical ambivalence. Of course, the
result reached by the majority is correct; it is only that the wrong reasons are given
for reaching it.
Q: Let me anticipate you. The Massachusetts statute under attack absolutely
prohibited corporate contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing
the outcome of a referendum, unless the issue to be voted upon materially affected
the corporation's assets."2 7 Taking the horizontalist perspective, you will no doubt
find content discrimination immediately. The statute singles out certain speakers,
corporations, and certain messages, those related to referenda, for special burdens.
Am I right?
'R. BuNcE, supra note 214, at 96-122 (describing the principal corporate giants heavily engaged in
communications). See Levin, Broadcast Structure, Technology, and the ABC-ITT Merger Decision, 34
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 452 (1969) (describing the most famous attempt to dominate international
communications).
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
'The plurality opinion by Justice Powell and Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, are by far the most important. The Chief Justice's concurring opinion underscores points made
in the literature regarding the suggestion that the institutional press may have some structural role to play
in the American scheme. See note 208 supra. Justice Rehnquist's dissent deals primarily with the
wisdom of deferring to legislative judgments by the states. While I cannot dismiss everything in his
opinion out of hand, I do believe that Rehnquist's emphasis upon federalism and deference to legislative
choice is out of place in the first amendment field. See also 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that the majority would substitute its judgment for that of the Massachusetts
legislature).
'MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55 S 8 (West Supp. 1977-78).
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A: Almost. I must quarrel, however, with the words you would put in my
mouth. If it is clear, as it seems to be, that some corporate expression is entitled to
some first amendment protection, and if it is clear, as again it seems to be, that
expenditures of money at least affect pure speech, then this was an easy case. It was
made doubly so by the state legislature's brazen insertion of a legislative determination that referenda concerning individual income taxation could not materially
affect a corporation's economic interests. Even counsel for Massachusetts was
forced to concede that the statute, as it emerged from the legislature for the third
time, was "tailormade" to prohibit corporations from campaigning against a pending
graduated income tax proposal. 228 That concession should have decided the case,
for if anything is clear in this field, it is that government has no business suppressing
expression of which it disapproves. Justice Powell's opinion saw the issue and,
indeed, cited Mosley229 for the proposition that purposeful content discrimination
28
is invalid. 1

Q: But you said that Powell relied on the wrong reasoning.
A: He did. Instead of saying only so much as I have suggested and stopping,
Powell rambled on through an elaborate discussion of free speech values and
balanced them against the articulated state interest in avoiding corporate domination of the political process and protecting dissenting shareholders 8
To my
mind, he bought trouble that he might have avoided.
Q: You cannot think that he might have avoided passing on whether corporations have a right to free speech.
A: Your question mixes matters I would hold distinct. First is the question
whether corporations have any constitutional protection at all. Notwithstanding
Justice Rehnquist, it seems late in the day to propose that corporations be deprived
of their enviable status as persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amend435 U.S. at 793.

Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
435 U.S. at 784-85.
/Id. at 786-95. On the latter point, Justice Powell distinguished the Court's recent decision in
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Responding to Justice White, who devoted a fair
part of his dissent to an analogy to Abood, Powell insisted that it is one thing to hold that nonunion
employees cannot be forced to support political activity with which they disagree and quite another to
hold that, because of the possibility of minority dissent, the expression of an organization can be suppressed. In any event, he said, shareholders are not required to purchase stock in any company. 435 U.S.
at 794-95 n.34. While Justice Powell's arguments may not be completely satisfying, I must say that
Justice White fares no better. At the outset, he commented, almost offhand, that the interest recognized
in Abood was not present in Buckley and would not justify restrictions upon "associations, corporate or
otherwise, formed for the express purpose of advancing a political or social cause." Id. at 777 n.12.
I am not sure I follow his reasoning. It is rare, I think, that any organization is formed for the purpose
of advancing any single point of view. There are fine distinctions and gradations of opinion in any
"cause," and, accordingly, whenever such an organization acts it is likely to dissatisfy some of its members-at least in part. It seems to me, then, that the cold logic of White's position would permit those
dissenters to silence the majority. Since such a result would effectively eliminate the right of association
from American political affairs, it must and can be avoided. It seems fair enough to accept Justice
Powell's suggestion that dissenting shareholders pursue their minority interests through the usual corporate
channels or, in an appropriate case, through a stockholders' derivative suit. If those paths are impractical, then their stock may simply be sold. I do not agree with Justice White that the employees in
Abood might have quit and found other jobs. The individual interests at stake are, in my judgment,
quite different, and, applying a standard of review that is stringent but which recognizes the distinction
between money and speech, I come out with Justice Powell. Indeed, I should have thought that if
Justice White is serious about his compelled support argument, he must do more than tolerate the Massachusetts law. He must insist upon it. That he clearly does not do. See note 266 inlra.
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ment.28 2 This is not to say that there is no appeal in the suggestion. In theory anyway, corporations are creatures of state law, and it has never been clear how the
Federal Constitution can protect them against that same law, or why, to take an
emotional example, a fetus has no similar claim to personhood. 283 It is plain, of
course, that in both Santa Clara3 4 and Roe2 3 the Court decided as it did in order
to fashion constitutional tools for its own use in contending with legislative majorities. It is only a reflection of maturing American values that in 1886 Chief
Justice Waite was concerned for liberty of contract while in 1973 Justice Blackmun
wished to protect a woman's decision to end an unwanted pregnancy. If Santa
Clara had not stood in the way, the rigidity of Lochner3 8 might have been tempered
well before 1934, and, in the newer cases, the debilitating effect of great corporate
wealth upon the political process might have been easily cabined.2 37 On the other
hand, the corporate form is the mainstay of the American economy. If constitutional
safeguards are eliminated, or even seriously threatened, there is simply no telling
what the repercussions might be. While some of us would not flinch at fundamental economic change in this country, it is hardly surprising that the Court is
in no hurry to bring it about through constitutional adjudication.
This brings me to a second question-whether, granting that corporations are
persons, they are automatically entitled to the same liberties guaranteed to individuals.
In prior cases, the Court had denied corporations some liberties thought to be
somehow personal" 8 and never expressly held that commercial corporations have
first amendment rights.2 3 9 In First National Bank Powell had only to hold that
corporations are persons and they have some measure of first amendment protection.
This he did. He did not have to resolve all free speech questions regarding the
2 40
corporate form. And that he, quite properly, did not do.
Q: Where did he go wrong?
A: For one thing, rather than treating the scope of corporate first amendment
rights at issue in the case at bar, he reworked the question presented to emphasize
the contribution corporate expression on a referendum issue might make to the
marketplace of ideas concerning it-that is, the interest of individuals in hearing
what corporations have to say.241 Ordinarily, I am troubled by an emphasis upon
correlative first amendment interests, 242 but I suppose that in cases involving corporations this emphasis is warranted more so than in others. I have to agree with
See 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recalling the summary manner in which the Court
dismissed the argument at an early date).
$'See
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
"Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"'Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Cf. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
"E.g.,
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 421 (1974) (holding that corporations lack
the constitutional interest in privacy accorded to individuals); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944) (holding that corporations have no fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
2435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (pointing out that in prior cases the Court had simply
failed to distinguish between artificial and natural persons).
'u' Id. at 777-78 n.13 (opinion of Justice Powell) (finding no occasion for considering whether there may
be in other cases some basis for restricting the expression of corporations that would be invalid against
individuals).
' Id. at 776 (stating the question as whether the statute abridged expression the first amendment
"was meant to protect").
'See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
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Justice White. The individual speaker's interest in speaking his or her mind is
difficult to locate in a corporate speech case.248 For another, Powell continued the
error of Buckley2 44 by treating the Massachusetts regulation of expenditures as a
direct restriction on speech.24 5 Judge Wright has pointed out that in Buckley the
real question was whether a regulation of money could be justified when there was
an undoubted incidental effect on speech.2 46 The Court asked, however, whether
a supposed regulation of pure speech could be justified when it had some incidental
24
effect on money.2 47 In Buckley, and again in First National Bank, the O'Brien
case offered the most appropriate standard of review-apart, of course, from its
refusal to examine legislative purpose.249
Q: Even if you are correct, and I am not yet ready to concede that you are, as
I read Justice Powell's opinion he did apply something very much like the O'Brien
test, asking whether the state interests asserted were "compelling" and whether
Massachusetts had employed a means to its objectives that avoided "unnecessary
abridgement."'2 50 Indeed, he cited cases you have mentioned as adopting essentially
25 1
the O'Brien framework.
A: Yes, but it is not the same. We get only another example of Justice Powell's
ad hoc balancing approach to free speech adjudication. 52 He may speak the language of a more structured, two-prong analysis, but his citations are loose and not
to be taken at face value. If you look closely, you will see that he even used what
he did not decide about the scope of corporate speech rights as another consideration
to be pumped into the jumble of facts and circumstances to be identified, appraised,
and balanced. 255 The opinion reads much like the Court's recent commercial expression cases. It is not, we are told, that commercial speech has no protection; neither
is it that it has all the protection of a soapbox campaign speech 25 4 The Court tells
us only that it will worry over the particular case and do its best to arrive at a just
result that respects constitutional values. In the end, we get neither the consistently
negative protection of the verticalist, incitement cases, nor the horizontalist focus
on unjustified content discrimination. Instead, we get only analytical imprecision
and the uncertainty that always accompanies case-by-case adjudication.255
' 435 U.S. at 804-05 (dissenting opinion).
' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
'Id. at 786 & n.23 (opinion of Powell, J.).
m Wright, supra note 71, at 1007.
27424 U.S. at 16.
'United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
See note 14 supra.
435 U.S. at 786.
'See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
See Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24
STANr. L. REv. 1001 (1972); Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH.
L. REv. 445 (1972).
'See 435 U.S. at 786-95.
n'See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
It should not be assumed, for example, that because the Court upset the Massachusetts statute,
insofar as it prohibited corporate expenditures regarding referenda, it will necessarily strike down laws
that reach contributions to partisan candidates. Indeed, Justice Powell offered one possible distinctionthat in the latter cases the state's special interest in avoiding the creation of political debts comes to the
fore. Essentially, he called to mind the line drawn in Buckley between campaign contributions, which
carry the danger of debt creation, and independent expenditures, which may not. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 46 (1975). See note 59 supra. I have never been impressed with that position, and I hardly suggest
that the Court will rest upon it alone when, for instance, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act comes up
for review. I do anticipate, however, that the Court will strike a different balance-emphasizing rather
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Q: But the Court considers O'Brien, in name if not in analysis, to suggest a
relaxed standard of review. 5 Would the Massachusetts statute not have passed
muster under it?
A: I think not. The proper standard falls between the very stringent test for
direct penalties upon protected expression and the diluted standard of review reserved for purely economic regulations. And, again, its focus is horizontal. I have
no doubt that the absolute prohibition on corporate expenditures in this case was
invalid. It was no fair attempt to prevent corporations from drowning out less
wealthy opponents. Rather, it was a flagrant attempt to silence corporations entirely
and to permit only those in favor of a graduated income tax to reach the public
with their views.
Q: Justice White's dissent took a different tack altogether.
A: Yes, and in the process the dissent offered some important insights. White,
too, allowed that corporate expression is protected in some measure by the first
amendment and that expenditures of money constitute protected speech. 2 7 But he
went on to say what surely must be obvious-that corporations owe their advantageous economic position to state policy 58 And, most important for my purposes, he
recognized that in restricting the expenditure of corporate funds to matters related
to the corporation's property interests, the state of Massachusetts had responded
not to just any chosen public policies but to values that themselves have first amendment significance.25 The statute sought to prevent the speech of some to drown
out the speech of others by the sheer power of the dollar.
Q: Of course, you do not disagree with that.
A: On the contrary, in my judgment White started well and then faltered. He
recognized that the state is responsible for the economic power of corporations but
neglected to say that much the same thing is true of individuals. To be sure, corporations put an easier case. We can readily point to the corporate charter, perpetual
life, capitalization capability, and limited liability of these state-chartered entities.
Yet it is only a matter of degree. Wealthy individuals and unincorporated groups,
too, obtain and keep vast resources with the aid of state law that protects and gives
effect to their financial arrangements. I have made the point before2 6 Everything
government does must be considered-from its fiscal and monetary policy to its
basic contract law. The balance of economic power, in Massachusetts and any other
state, is and has been weighted in favor of the haves to the detriment of the havethan neglecting the corporate character of the plaintiff, finding its first amendment interests less significant, and insisting that the state's objectives are, if not different, then at least more compelling.
'See note 14 supra.
- 435 U.S. at 807-08. His support for Buckley's invalidation of expenditure limitations was, however, backhanded, and he attempted to distinguish the case as best he could. Id. at 806-07 nn.6 & 7.
Of course, in Buckley itself, White dissented on the issue. Indeed, he was the only justice on the Court
to see clearly the distinction drawn by Judge Wright. 424 U.S. at 259 (dissenting opinion) (emphasizing
that the campaign finance act regulated not speech but the giving and spending of money).
435 U.S. at 809 (contending that the state's interest was not in "equalizing the resources of
opposing candidates or opposing positions" but in "preventing institutions which have been permitted
to amass wealth as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain economic purposes
from using that wealth to acquire an unfair advantage in the political process").
" Id. at 803-04.
'o See text at note 216 supra.
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nots. The ultimate responsibility for this state of affairs lies with government and
when government attempts to circumscribe the effects of its policies on the system
of freedom of expression it is hardly a time to insist upon a laissez-faire attitude
toward speech that does not prevail in economics generally. Any such insistence
ignores rather than identifies the true relationship between money and speech.
Q: If I understand correctly, you are suggesting that government can limit
the expenditure of funds by corporations, or even individuals, but cannot absolutely
prohibit it. The latter course would do more than prevent great wealth from drowning out the voices of the weak; it would silence the strong altogether. Said another
way, government is already favoring the speech of the wealthy with its various
economic policies and the very framework of law. An attempt to eliminate that
content discrimination by restricting expenditures is valid, but government has no
business overcompensating, silencing the wealthy, and establishing a new order of
content discrimination in favor of the weak. The question I have is this. Why do
you not urge government to arrive at neutrality by reexamining the advantages it
now gives to industrial giants? If the difficulty lies in an imbalance in economic
power, then perhaps the way to resolve it is not by restricting the expression of the
strong but by breaking up concentrations of power. Let me be blunt. Why not tell
states like Massachusetts that if they are concerned that corporations have too much
influence they should eliminate the corporate form?
A: To begin, I must say that you do understand correctly. I think government
must be neutral, but throttling the speech of any person, or entity, is not the way
to set about it. Turning, however, to your question, I can only respond through
Justice White. You will recall that he worried over the effect restrictive policies
governing corporations might have on the press."- The New York Times and the
television networks operate in the corporate form just as do banks. Putting the
potential economic disruption to one side, junking the corporate animal would
likely eviscerate the institutional press-those media giants that alone have the wherewithal to keep an eye on government and report its crimes of commission and
omission to the public. Thus a blanket elimination of the corporate form would
constitute the very worst form of content discrimination 22 Government would
strike a death blow against its most effective critics.
Q: Is there no way to exempt media corporations?
A: I think of no criterion that genuinely satisfies. Of course, the Massachusetts
statute in First National Bank offered one possibility. Perhaps the expenditures of
media corporations are by definition always tied to their economic interests.2 63 Still,
I am unpersuaded. Justice White embraces essentially that logic and ends up protecting commercial advertising by banks and suppressing their political speech.
2' Compare 435 U.S. at 808 n.8 (White, J., dissenting) (declining to decide whether newspapers
have a first amendment right to operate in the corporate form) with id. at 781 n.17 (opinion of
Powell, J.) (reading the Massachusetts statute to apply to all corporations).
' See text at notes 18-20 supra. The truth of Justice White's suggestion that denying the corporate
form to the media while making it available to other concerns would constitute content discrimination
is, I think, self-evident. But the issue there is of a different order.
' See 435 U.S. at 781 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Q: Yet you would allow the states to limit corporations' expenditures. If such
restrictions are applied to the Tines, the same issue will be presented.
A: I think not. Expenditure restrictions applied to the economic resources
devoted to actual publishing or broadcasting come ever so close to direct limitations
on speech. Even the Massachusetts court construed the statute in First National Bank
not to apply to "in-house" newspapers and communications with shareholders2 64
I would argue that corporations that speak, even to the world, through their own
publishing or broadcasting equipment are engaged in pure speech. Corporations
that merely purchase space and time for advertising in media operated by others
are spending money. There is a difference, and it is fundamental." 5 If a corporation's desire to be heard is strong enough to warrant the establishment of its own
publishing organ, then I am content to call the product speech and not an expenditure of funds.
Q: That is ridiculous. The definitional question is the same. It makes no
sense at all to distinguish vaguely between doing something and hiring it done.
A: I wish I could offer a more satisfying answer.
Q: Let me ask you, once and for all, what you would have done in First National Bank. You have said that the case might have been decided summarily, but
I have the impression that you might have done some rambling of your own.
A: I would have done what
gesting-that Massachusetts had
will, to prevent those with great
from dominating a referendum
2 66
policy-making process.

Justice White explicitly refrained from even suga responsibility, a constitutional obligation if you
economic power, operating as corporations or not,
on a graduated income tax or any other public

Q: Again you insist upon affirmative governmental involvement in matters
traditionally thought to be beyond government's authority to influence.2 6
A: What I propose is affirmative action only if you insist upon ignoring government's responsibility for the existing state of affairs. Government is already
involved, indeed lined up on the side of wealth. I am suggesting only that government stop playing favorites. Since it is practically impossible in this context to
counter the power of wealth by subsidizing the expression of others, the only path
open to government is restricting the use of money in the marketplace of ideas.26
' Id. at 773 n.7.
'Id. at 781-82 n.17 (pointing out that media corporations do not have to make "separately
identifiable expenditures to communicate their views"). Of course, if a newspaper were to make an
ordinary campaign contribution to a candidate, the question would be entirely different. Accord, id. at
825 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that a newspaper corporation "need have no greater
right than any other corporation to contribute money" to a partisan campaign); id. at 808 n.8 (White,
J., dissenting) (assuming that the first amendment does not "immunize media corporations any more
than other types of corporations from restrictions upon electoral contributions and expenditures").
'Id. at 803 (dissenting opinion) (insisting that he would not suggest "for a moment" that the
first amendment
"requires" a state to forbid the use of corporate funds for political purposes).
7
26 See text at notes 198-205
supra.
' This is not a case in which a horizontalist can insist that support for dissenters must be provided.
That is possible in the access cases-not so here. Then, too, this is not a case in which the Court can
accomplish first amendment ends without the aid of the legislative branch. Of course, I do believe that
the Constitution of its own force mandatcs governmental involvement to prevent domination of the
political process by those with great wealth, and the inability of our adjective law to place such questions
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I do not suggest that these matters are not delicate. They most certainly are. And
the Court should and must examine government's actions with the greatest care.
My point is simply that government is acting and must act 3 To deny the facts,
to insist upon the ancient myths of verticalism, is to condemn us all to the petty
economic interests of those upon whom government has deposited great power.

before the Court for decision is simply beside the point. See text at note 207. However, I recognize
that here, perhaps more than in the cases discussed earlier, the constitutional mandate can have practical
meaning only with the assistance of the legislature.
" Tribe, Metatheory, supra note 222, at 245 (insisting that "a satisfying theory of free speech must
prove adequate to the challenge of the affirmative state").

